Commonwealth of Virginia v. Blair B. Stringfellow by unknown
'(" 
I 
/'/ ~&! --~~ / 
Record No. 2133 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
v. 
BLAIR B. STRINGFELLOW 
FRO :If THE ll CST! NGS CO"l'"RT OF T H E CITY OI•" RTClL\fOXO. 
''The briefs shall be printed in type not lc ss in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bo md, in accord· 
~mce with Act of Assembly, approved :Marc.1 1, 1903 ; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to r eceive or file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the •:tforemcntioned 
r equirements." 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mu tion of counsel. 
M. B. W .A TTS, Clerk. 
i '/ J 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
This case probably will be called at the 
session of court to be held · ;..6J ~ll f 
You will be advised later more definitely 
as to the date. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
SUBJECT INDEX 
•Page 
Assignments of Errors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 · 
Jurisdiction of this Court ............. ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
Statement of the· Case ................................. 4 
·Statutes Involved. • . . ............... ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Position of the Commonwealth ........ ~ ................ 10 
Position of the· Applicant ............. ~ ................ 11 
Argument. . . . ....................... • ................ 11 
A-The Indebtedness of Scott & Stringfellow to A.p- . 
plicant is Taxable to Him U nd~r the Provisions 
of Section 69 of the Tax Code qf Virginia .... ~ .• 11 
1. The .Statute Literally Const:rued Imposes the 
Tax ...................................... 11 
2. Section 168 of the Constitution in its Applica-
tion to the Virginia Tax Statutes as a Whole 
Demands that Section 69 of the Tax Code be 
Construed so as to Impose tpe Tax .......... 16 
3. The Tax Authorities have •Construed Section 
69 of the Tax Code to Inclhde this Class of 
Applicant's Property and this Construction 
is Entitled to Great Weight ..... · ... : ...... 19 
4. The Attorney General has Qonstrued Section 
69 of the Tax Code to Incluc;Ie Open Accounts 
and this Construction is 1\fost Persuasive .... 20 
B-The Opinion of the Court Below; ................. 22 
C-Applicant 's Principal Contention· in the Court Be-
low ......................... ~ ................ 32 
D-Applicant 's •Contention that he is Denied the Equal 
Protection of the Law ......... : ................ 35 
Conclusion. . . . ................ : ..... I· ••••••••••••••• 36 
Prayer .............................. f· ............... 37 
Statement _Required by Rule 9 .. : : ...... 
1 
••.•••.••••••••• 37 
Oral Heanng Requested on Petition .... , ................ 37 
*Page numbers refer to marginal star :figures. 
I 
II _ 
TAlJL.E ·OF CASES 
'"'Page 
.Arcese v. Commonwealth, 160 Va. 116 ................... 2S 
Bank of Commerae v. Tennessee, 161 U. ~ .. 134 ........... 28 
Barber v. Danville, 149 Va. 418 ......................... 21 
Board of Supervisors v. City of Norfolk, 153 Va. 768 .... 28 
Jjradley v. Richmond; 110 Va. 521, affirmed 227 U. S. 477 .. 36 
Bridgewater Man. Co. v. FunkhotttSer, 115 Va. 476 ........ 1~ 
City of Norfolk v. Bell, 149 Va. 772 ...................... 20 
Cohen and Winston v. Walford, 111 Va. 812 ............. 4 
Colonial Beach v. DeAtley, 154 Va. 451 .................. 4 
Commorvwealth v. Armo~tr, 118 Va. 242, affirmed 246 U. S. 1.36 
Comnz.onwealth v. Im.perial Woolen Co., 290 Pa. 526, 139 
Atl. 199 .......................................... 12 
Commonwealth v. Lunchbur,q Y. 1J1. C. A., 115 Va. 745 .... 28 
Heisler v. Thmnas Coll-iery Co., 260 U. S. 245 ............. 36 
Hollywood Cem.etery Co. v. Com.tnonwealth, 123 Va. 
106. . . . . ................................... 29, 34, 35 
Hunton v. Com·monwealth, 166 Va. 229 .............. 20, 28 
Oliver Iron 111ining Co. v. Lm·d, 262 U.S. 172 ............ 36 
Richmond v. D1·ewry-Hu.qhes Co., 122 Va. 178 ........... 35 
R-ichmond Linen :Co. v. Lynchb1.1t·rg, 160 Va. 644 .......... 36 
Schermerhorn v. Com,mo'wwealth, 107 Va. 707 ............ 4 
South East P-ublic Service Corp. v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 
116 .............................................. 20 
State Board of Tax ConMnissio'l~ers v. Ja.ckson, 283 U. S. 
527 .............................................. 36 
Staunton v. Stout, 86 Va. 321. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
'J'.alley v. Brown, 146 Iowa 360, 125 N. W. 248 ............ 15 
· W. Va. P1.tlp & Paver Co. v. Karnes, 137 Va. 714 .... 15, 16, 34 
IN 'fH.E. 
Supreme Court of ~ppea~ of Virgim. 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 213:3 
' • , ' , ' I~ 
COMMON"\VE.ALTH OF VffiGINIA, 
versus 
BLAIR B. STRINGFELLOW. 
PETITION' •FOR WRIT OF ERROR ON B:EHALF OF 
THE CO~lNIONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. 
(Italics supplied unless otherwise indicated.) 
- To the Hono-rable Chief J·ustice 011~d the Associate Justi_ce.q 
of the Supre~ne :Court of Appeals of Vir,giwia: 
Your petitioner, the Commonwealth p£ Virginia, acting 
herein by the State Tax ·Commissioner,\'who is the proper 
officer designated by law to represent the Commonwealth of 
Virginia in such matters, respectfully represents that on the 
20th day of January, 1938, Blair B. Stri11g£ellow, a resident 
of Richmond, Virg·inia, instituted in the ; Hustings Court of 
the City of Richmond, Virginia, a certaiJ.l, proceeding at law 
against your petitioner for exoneration £rom and refund of 
certain State taxes on intangible per~onal *property as-
2* sessed against the said Blair B. Stringfellow, whereupon 
such proceedings were had therein tmtt, on the 23rd day 
of December, 1938, a final judgment was re~dered against your 
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petitioner, and a transcript of the record in said suit and 
of the judgment therein is herewith exhibited. 
Your petitioner is advised and represents to your Honors 
that the said judgment is erroneous and that it is aggrieved 
thereby in the following particulars, namely: 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERRORS. 
1. 
The court erred in holding that Blair B. Stringfello'v was , 
not subject to the State property tax imposed by section 69 
of the Tax Code of Virginia on account of the indebtedness 
to the said Stringfellow of the partnership of Scott and 
Stringfellow as of January ~ of each of the years, 1934, 1935 
and 1936. 
2. 
The court erred in exonerating· Blair B. Stringfellow from 
State property taxes assessed against him by the State De-
partment of Taxation for the tax years 1934, 1935 and 19'36 
in the amounts of $48.36, $47.42 and $13.41, respectively. 
3. 
The court erred in directing that Blair B. •stringfel-
3* low be refunded State property taxes assessed against 
him by the Commissioner of the Revenue of the City 
of Richmond for the tax year 1936 in tile amount of $8.94. 
The second and third assignments of error· are entirely 
· dependent upon the first assignment and, therefore, argu-
ment will be confined entirely to the·-itrst assignment. 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT. 
The amount of State taxes involved in this particular case 
is only $118.13. However, the construction of a State statute 
imposinp; a tax is dirP.ctly involved in tl1e final judgment 
herein, thus drawing in question a "matter not merely pe-
cuniary''. Therefore, your petitioner is not precluded from 
SP.eking a writ of error by the amount of the tax. See sec-
tions 6R36 and 6337 of the Code of Virginia. In any event, 
the instant case is simply that of a single individual. ~{any 
other individuals are similarly situated and the record (R., 
p. 54) shows that there are "large taxable values involved". 
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Indeed in a companion case of another ~dividual now pend-
ing in the court below, awaiting a final \decision in the case 
at bar, $1,429.18 of State taxes on the same class of property 
are involved. 1' 
TherP- is no controversy here relative to the amount of the 
tax, the only question decided by the court below being the 
authority of the State tax authorities to assess «'the 
4 * challenged tax under section 69 of ~he Tax Code prop-
erly construed. That this court has jurisdiction in such 
a case is well settled by its prior decisions. Staunton v. 
Stou.t, 86 Va. 321, 322; Schcrme-rhot·n v. Commonwealth, 107 
Va. 707, 709; Cohen and Jl'inston v. Wq.:lford, 111 Va. 812; 
Colo.wial Beach v. DeAtle~J, 154 Va. 451, 457. 
STATE~1:ENT OF THE CASE. 
Blair B. Stringfellow, hereinafter sometimes called the 
applicant, a resident of Richmond, Virginia, is a customer 
of Scott & Stringfellow, stock brokers of, Richmond and also 
members of the New York Stock Excha~ge (R., pp. 13, 14). 
Applicant maintains an investment acccn1nt with .Scott & · 
Stringfellow, the funds constituting· such iaccount being made · 
up principally of proceeds from the sale of securities for 
applicant tog·ether ·with dividends from. stock and interest 
on bonds held by Scott &. Stringfellow foi· him. Occasionally 
applicant also places to. the credit of his account checks which · 
he receives directly representing dividends from stocks. The 
principal charge against. the account is for the purchase of 
securities for applicant, although occasionally a deposit is 
made in an uptown bank, a.t his request, to the credit of Mrs. 
Stringfellow and sometimes a small amount of cash is ad-
vanced to him when he ''runs short''. The account is a typi-
cal account that a stock broker carries with its larger cus-
tomers (R., pp. 15, 16, 17, 18). 1The funds making up the 
5• account are held for purposes ·x.of: investment only. 
Scott & Stringfellow doP-s not accep~, and indeed never 
has accepted, deposits for the purpose <)f subsequent with-
drawal on check or draft (R., pp. 19, 20).1 Interest was paid 
by Scott & Stringfellow on customers' ct~edit balances up to 
the effective date of the Glass-Stcga.ll Ac,t in 1933, but none 
has been paid since that time. Interest is now and has been 
charged on customers' debit balances (R., pp. 20, 28, 29). 
The account was characterized by defendant as an ''open 
account claim'' against Scott & Stringf,llow for which he 
held no security or any note or bond fro¥! the firm (R., pp. 
21, 22). The books of Scott & Stringfello'f" carry an account 
headed "}.fr. B. B. Stringfellow", a.ppli~ant here, showing 
I· 
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his balance at all times, and applicant each month receives 
a written statement of his account from Scott & Stringfellow 
showing his credit balance, if any, as of the close of the pre-
ceding month (R., pp. 32, 33, 34 and Exhibit, Pope No. 1). 
Scott & Stringfellow has not done a banking business since 
January 1, 1934 (R., pp. 29, 30), and apparently, from a con-
sideration of the whole record, has never done what is nor-
mally termed a banking business, although the firm was one 
of a limited group authorized to engage in the business of a 
private banker (R., pp. 29, 30). 
The administrative practice of the State Department of 
Taxation over a period of ten years (practically the life of 
the Department) in taxing "open account claims", in-
6~ eluding *·credit balances 'vith brokers, owing to individ-
uals by persons, firms and corporations not doing a bank-
ing business was· thoroughly established. This practice is 
fully set out on pages 36 to 58 of the Record, to which special 
attention is directed. It will not be repeated in detail here, 
but will be discussed in the argument. Suffice it to say now 
that the Department of Taxation throughout this period has 
unifortnly ruled that these claims are subject to taxation, 
and has taxed them under section 69 of the Tax Code of Vir-
ginia under the classification of "bonds * * * notes and other 
evidences of debt :)1: * * and all demands and claims, however, 
evidenced .v. ... :~~:." These ''open account clain1s" are of many 
kinds and ~lasses (R., pp. 38, 39, 40.) and ''large taxable 
values" are involved in credit balances with brokers alone 
(R., p. 54). 
In regular course of audit the Department of Taxation 
ascertained that applicant had reported for taxation for the 
tax years 19R4. 1935 and 1936, his credit balances with Scott 
& Stringfellow as "tnoney • * * on deposit with any bank or 
other corporation or firm or person doing a banking business'' 
taxable undP.r section 70 of thP. Tax Code at the rate of 20 
cents per $100. Accordingly the Department assessed addi-
tional taxes against the applicant on the theory that these 
credit balances 'vere properly taxable under section 69 of 
the Tax Code at the rate of 50 cents per $100. This proceed-
ing followed. 
7:ft. "''STATUTES INVOLVED. 
The statutes directly involved arP. section 168 of the Con-
stitution and sections 69 and 70 of the Tax Code of Virginia. 
For convP.nience they are set out in full below: 
Section 168 of the Constitution: 
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"Taxable property; taxes shall be uniform as to class of 
subjects and levied and collected unde~ g~neral laws.-:All 
pro.perty, except as herei1urJter provide41 shall be taxed; all 
taxes, whether State, local or municipal, shall be uniform 
upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits 
of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and col-
lected under general laws. The General Assembly may de-
nne and classify taxable subjects, and, except as to classes 
of property herein expressly seg-regated for either State or 
local taxation, the General Assembly may segregate the sev-
eral classes of property so as to specify and determine upon 
what subjects State taxes, and upon what subjects local taxes 
may be levied.'' 
Section 69 of the Tax Code : 
"Bonds, notes, other evidences of debt, demands and claims1 
secured or not secured.-All bonds (except bonds of the 
United States, bonds of the State of Virginia, and bonds of 
counties, cities and towns or other political subdivisions of 
this State), notes and other evidences :'of debt, including 
bonds of other States than Virginia, bonds of counties, cities 
and towns located outside of the State of Virginia, bonds of 
railroad and canal companies and other corporations, bonds 
of individuals and all demands and claims; how·ever evidenced, 
·whether secured by mortgage, deed of 'trust, judgment or 
otherwise, or not so secured; provided, however, that no 
property taxable under any other section of this chapter shall 
be taxable under this section. 
''On all property defined by this section there is hereby 
annually levied a tax of fifty cents on every one hundred dol-
lars of the fair market value thereof. 
8* *"In every action at law or suit in equity in a court 
of record for the collection of any bonds, notes or other 
evidences of debt, the plaintiff shall be required to allege in 
his pleadings or to prove at any time before final judgment 
is entered, (1) that such bonds, notes or\, other evidences of 
debt have been assessed for taxation for !each and every tax 
year on the first day of which he was the :owner of same, not 
exceeding three years prior to that in which the suit or ac-
tion is brought; or (2) that such bonds, <notes or other evi-
den~es of debt constituted a part of th~ capital employed 
in the businesss of such taxpayer and wer,~ taxed as such ; or 
(3) that the suitor has not paid, or is unable to pay the taxes 
and penalties but is willing for the same to be paid out of 
the first recovery on the evidence of de~t; or ( 4) that the 
bond, note or other evidence of debt sued ~pon is not ta;xable 
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hereunder in the hands of the plaintiff; and no judgment 
or decree of a court of r:ecord shall be valid unless the al-
legation herein required. w~s made or unless proof was ad-
duced of the same before final judgment was entered .. 
"But the title to real estate heretofore or hereafter sold 
under a deed of trust shall not be drawn in question upon the 
ground that the holder of the notes secured by such deed of 
trust- did not list the same for taxation; and all judgments 
upon bonds, ~otes and other evidences of debt entered before 
J1me twenty-second, nineteen hundred and twenty-six, are 
hereby validated, legalized and confirmed, and are declared 
to have the same force and effect as if they contained the al-
legation herein required. 
''When in any action at law or suit in equity it is ascer-
tained. that there are unpaid taxes and penalties on the evi-
dence of debt sought to be enforced, and the suitor makes it 
appear to the court that he has not paid or is unable to pay 
these tuxes and penalty, but is willing for the same to be 
paid out of the first recovery on the evidence of debt, the 
court shall have authority to enter as a part of any judgment 
or decretal order in said prom~edings that the amount of taxes 
and penalty due and owing· shall be paid to the proper officer 
out of the first collection on said judgment or decree.'' 
9*' •section 70 of the Tax Code: 
"Money.-AU money (excP.pt money which is otherwise 
taxed) on deposit with any bank or other corporation or firm 
or person doing a banking businAss, or in the possession or un-
der control of the o'vner, whether such n1onev be actually in or 
out of this State and bP.longing to a resident of this~ State? 
· which shall include certificates of deposit of any bank; banking 
association, trust or security company or partial payment de-
posits made with industrial loan associations for the pur-
chase of income bonds, certificates of investment or invest-
ment bonds, bearing a total interest rate paid or to be paid 
not exceeding· five per centum per a.nnum; all money under 
control of a court receiver or commissioner in pursuance of 
an order, judgment or decree of any court or in the l1ands 
or under the control of an executor, administrator, g-uardian, 
trustee, ag·ent, or other fiduciary; and all money deposited 
to the credit of any suit, not· in the hands of a receiver or 
other fiduciary. 
"On all money as defined by this section there is hereby 
annually levied a tax of twenty cents on every one hundred 
dollars of the actual value thereof. 
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''Each clerk of court mentioned in section sixty-three hun-
dred and ten of the Code of Virginia, a$ amended, shall fur-
nish the Comptroller on January first lof each year with a 
copy of the record made by such clerk in conformity with 
that section showing the balance on hand on January first; 
and the Comptroller shall keep a record of the same in a book 
kept by hin1 for that purpose. Such clerk shall also furnish 
a like list of such balances to the exanliner of records who 
shall examine the same, and if found correct he shall report 
the same to the commissioner of revenue of the county or 
city, who, if such money be not otherwise taxed, shall enter 
the same upon his property book and assess the proper tax 
thereon, which shall be paid by such clerk to the treasurer of 
the county. or city upon presentation of the proper tax bill 
therefor, and the amount so paid shall! be credited against 
such deposit, and the date and amount 'of such .credit shall 
be endorsed on the certificate by the clerk.'' 
10* *POSITION OF THE COMl\tiONWEALTH. 
I • 
The Commonwealth contends that the indebtedness of 
Scott & Stringfellow to applicant is intangible property tax-
able to him at the rate of 50 eents per one hundred dollars. 
of value under the classification defined by section 69 of the 
Tax Code as ''bonds, * * * notes and other evidences of debt, 
* • • and all demands and claims, • * •.'' 1\'Iore particularly 
the Commonwealth contends that this indebtedness may be 
taxed as an "evidence of debt", but that it undoubtedly is in-
cluded in the phrase ''and all demands and claims''. 
AdmittHdly Scott & Stringfellow are riot doing a banking 
business arid, therefore, the indebtedness cannot be taxed 
under section 70 of the Tax Code as '' mo;ney * * * on deposit 
with any bank or other* • * firm •Y.< * * doing a banking busi-
ness." This is conceded by applicant, by
1 
the Common'lvealth, 
and by the co'ltrt below. Therefore, the Commonwealth con-
tends that this property, and a great de~l of other property 
coming wifhin the same general classific~~ion, must be taxed 
. llnder section 69 of the Tax Code; that the property not only 
comes literally within the plain language! of the statute, but, 
even if there were a reasonable doubtl the statute must, 
if possible, be construed so as to include:.it in order to com-
ply with the mandate of section 168 of t~e Constitution that 
''all property, except as hereinafter pro'1ded, shall be taxed 
* •• ,, r • 
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11* *POSITION OF THE APPLlCANT. 
Applicant contends that the indebtedness of Scott & String-
fellow is not taxable to him under section 70 of the Tax Code, 
in which contention the Common,vealth concurs. Applicant 
asserts further, however, that the indebtedness is not taxable 
to him under section 69 of the Tax Code. He denies that 
it iR an ''evidence of debt" and says in effect that, while it 
may be a "demand or claim", it is not the kind of "demand 
or claim" that is taxable under section 69. Applicant's real 
contention, therefore, is that this property of his is com-
pletely exempt fro'ln taxation by Virgi1~ia under existing law. 
ARGUMENT. 
A. 
The Indebt.edness of Scott & Strin,qfellow to Applicant ~s 
Taxable to Hi1n Under the Provisions of Section 69 
of the Tax Code of Vi·r.ginia. 
1. 
The Statute Literally Construed Ii:nposes the· Tax. 
Section 69 of the Tax Code imposes a State property tax 
at the rate of 50 cents per hundred dollars of value on 
12* •" All bondr-; "' • * notPs and other evidences of debt, 
* * * and all demands and claims, however evidenced, 
* :II< *' " 
Cogent f1;·g·nnlent mig·ht be advanced to support the hypoth-
esiR that the debt to applicant i.s taxable as an "evidence 
of debt'' within the meaning of the quoted language. The 
debt is evidenced not only by an account in applicant's name 
on the books of the debtor, but the debtor sends or delivers 
to appliran t 1nonthly on its bill head a written statement o~ 
his account showing the balance due. See Exhibit "Pope 
No. l '··. Sun·]y this statement is analogous to a letter 
acknowled~int!· the debt. 
A case almost directly in point is ·Commonwealth v . .Im-
perial TVool.en Co., 290 Pa. 526, 139 Atl. 199.' There the stat-
ute imposed a property tax on the debtor corporation on ac-
count of ''all scrip, bonds, certificates and evidence of in-
debtedness issued * "" * or on which interest shall be paid."· 
The question was whether indebtedness represented by en-
iriesc::::n:::::h :: ::~::::~:::r la8::n:::~~ p~i: 
interest, but which were not evidenced 1by any paper, docu-
ment, credit memorandum, written acknowledgment or any 
substitute therefor given by the debtor corporation to its 
creditor, was taxable as an "evidence of indebtedn~ss~' .. The 
argument was made that there must be (the same argument 
is made in the case at bar) "some outstanding e·vidence. of 
indebtedness''. This was the court's reply: 
13* *''It remains to inquire whether the entries in ap-
pellant's books are evidences of indebtedness. We 
think there can be no question as to this ; appearing as they 
do on its own books of account they would be receivable in 
any proceeding 'vhere the question was in controversy as 
evidence of indebtedness to the persons· to whom the money 
was due. 
''Appellant's argument proceeds along lines assuming that 
'vhat was intended to be covered by the act is some outstand-
ing evidence of indebtedness. As pointed out by the court 
below, the act of 1919 does not use the' word 'outstanding' 
in connection with evidences of indebtedness on which in-
terest shall be paid; it adds this class to others taxable un-
der the act of 1913. Quoting from the opinion of the court 
below: 
• 
''We think the manifest purpose of the Legislature was to 
tax all indebtedness of corporations, ho,vever evidenced, and 
thus lo nlace 1hem all on an equality so far as loan taxes are 
concerned: otherwise a corporation which had borrowed 
money nncl ~·iv-Pn nn obligation for it would be taxed~ whereas 
one which h»d borrowed a. like sum and made an entry thereof 
upon its books 'voulcl escape the tax." · 
Bnt there is other lang'Uage in the statute wl1ich so plainly 
embraces the item here involved that lithe Commonwealth 
need not rest its case on the hypothesis just advanced. ·The 
statute also exacts a tax on ''all demands and claims, how-
ever evidenced". The plHasP ''all clet1Iands and claims" 
Rhmds in the section as a separate and distinct class of tax-
able property. It is lJUt in the spction u~aeeompanied by the 
'vord ''other'' or anv word of simj"~lar import. 
14$ *It is hardly possible to believe !that applicant will 
dP.nv thnt 1.he indebtedness of his broker ~o him repre-
"ents a claim or demand, a valuable mo!neyed demand that 
will be paid to him whenever he asks fo~', it (R., p. 27). In-
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deed, both applicant and his counsel characterize it as an 
11 open account clai-m" (R., p. 21). If the use of the words 
''however evidenced" in the statute are to be construed as 
requiring the claim or demand to. be ~videnced, then appli-
cant's claim or 4emand is evidenced not only by the -entries 
on the books of the debtor, but. also by the monthly state-
ments he receives from the debtor. 
The authorities are unanimous and conclusive. For ex-
ample: 
''The word 'claim' is a s·ynonym of moneyed demand. As 
generally employed, it comprehends eve1·y species of legal 
demand. To cwnstitute a claim1 the den1and need not be. due." 
2 Words & Phrases (3d Series) 86. 
''The assertion of a liability to the party making it {the 
claim) to do some service or pay a sum of money." Bouvier's 
·Law Dictionary (Baldwin's Century Edition) 175. 
To the same effect, Black's Law Dictiona1~y (3d Ed.) 333, 
334. 
"Enforceable claims1 securities, a.nd similar intangible in-
terests, however .represented, constitute 'property' subject 
to tax, sometimes being expressly included in statutory or 
constitutional definitions of taxable property, and the term 
'property' as employed under tax laws has been held to in-
clude many different kinds of claims, securities, or similar 
intangible interests. Except as the matter may be other-
wise controlled bv statutP., it is not essential to its stat.us as 
taxable property that a claim or debt should be the obliga-
tion of anv particular person. nor that it should be payable 
immediately, nor that the holder should certainly and 
15* without ~<doubt be able to enforce its ultimate collection; 
but it i~ nece~sary only that the claim should be a leg·al 
demand such as the law will recognize and enforce, fixed 
and certain and not indefinite or contingent, and liquidated 
as to. its arpount.'' 61 C. ,J. 192, 193. 
"The word 'demand' in Code making all credits taxable 
and defining 'credit' as including every claim or demand 
due, or to become due • >!I= " is more comprehensive than the 
word 'debt' which imports a sum of money owing- on a con-
tract, express or implied, and embraces rig·htful clairris. 
whether founded on a contract, tort, or a superior right of 
property, and is a word of wider signification than any other 
except 'claim', which means a demand of some matter as of 
' 
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right by one person on another to do ot forbear to do some 
act or thing as a matter of duty." Fromf:,Syllabus (supported 
by opinion) of 11alley v. Brou:n, 146 I~wa, 360, 125 N. W. 
248. 
This Court has had occasion to consider the breadth of 
the meaning of ''demands and claims'' in W. V a. Pulp <t 
Raper Co. v. Karnes, 137 Va. 714, 717,: 725. This case in-
volved the taxation of the statutory capital of a business un-
der what is now section 73 of the Tax :Code. One item of 
capital then (substantia.lly the same now) was: 
''All other property of any kind whatsoever, including all 
choses in action, equities, de1nands and claim,s." · 
In concluding the opinion the court sajd : 
"Examples. are cited in argument for the plaintiff in error 
of claims which might arise owing to the taxpayer from 
sources other than contracts 'vhich would be taxable to the 
corporation as capital, such as claims arising out of 
16* condemnation of the *property of ;the corporation for 
public use, or out of a tort committed against the cor-
poration, and it is urged that if such claims are taxable they 
are deductible. But the error in this assumption consists in 
this: Such claims would be taxable, but not as 'bills and 
accounts receivable.' They would be taxable ·under subsec-
tion 5 of the aforP.said statute as 'all other ~ • * demands 
a.nd claim,s,' and from such form of property the statute al-
lows no deduction whatsoever." 137 v~. 714, 725. 
If a claim arising out of condemnation of property or out 
of a tort committe_d is a taxable claim or demand, then it 
wonld he fn.tile to ar~·ue that this language does not~ embrace 
the item h-e-re involved. It is proper to state that this case is 
here cited Rolely for illustrating the sc?pe of the phrase 
''demands and claims''. 1 
It is submitted that the conclusion that "all demands and 
claims'' in section 69 of the Tax Code l~'terally includes the 
indebtedness of Scott & Stringfellow to ~pplicant cannot be 
denied. 
I -
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2. 
Section 168 of the Constitution in its Application to the Vir-
ginia Tax Statutes as a Whole Demands that Section 
69 of the Tax 1Code be Construed so as to 
Impose the Tax. 
The first provision of the first section (168) of the Article 
~of the Virginia Constitution dealing with taxation is: 
17* *''All property, except as hereinafter provided, 1 
shall he taxed ; 'x. *' *'.'' 
This is the bed rock of the Virginia tax structure. These 
words are not permissive. They constitute a mandate to the 
General Assembly and the Acts of that body will be con-
strued so as to comply with the mandate wherever possible. 
''The courts will also presume that the legislatui:e in-
tended to carry out the directions of the Constitution, and 
will so construe the statute, whenever such construction is 
admissible.'' Judson on Taxation, Sec. 432. 
It is not believed that anyone will have the temerity to 
dispute the soundness of the above doctrine. It is expressly 
:recognized in section 2 of the Tax Code of Virginia. Apply-
ing it to the instant case, what is the result? Even if there 
were a reasonable doubt as to the meaning of ''all demands 
and claims'' in section 69, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of taxing the property of applicant. But it has bee~ 
heretofore shown that this property comes squarely within 
the literal meaning of the section. Therefore, the section 
must be construed as if the Legislature not only complieq 
with, but intended to comply with the *constitutional 
18* mandate.2 
It is important to remember that not only does appli-
cant contend that this property (and necessarily the large 
amount of similar property owned by others) is not taxable 
under section 69 of the Tax Code, but he also contends that 
NoTE 1: The words "except as hereinafter provided" refer primarily to sec-
tions 183, 177 and 170 of the Constitution. Suffice. it to say here that none o£ 
these sections by any possible construction exempt from taxation the property here 
discussed. 
NoTE 2: That this court is acutely conscious of this constitutional mandate 
and the policy of the State to impose taxes on all the property of its citizens is 
clear from the language of its opinions. H ollyzuood C emctery Co. v. Com., 123. 
Va. 106, 108, 110; Tritsf Co. of Norfollt v. Com., 151 Va. 883, 895; Wise v. Com., 
122 Va. 693, 697; Bridgc·wafer ~Ma1t. Co. v. Funkhouser, 1\5 Va. 476, 481. • 
. . I 
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it is not taxable under any section of tlie Tax Code-that it 
escapes taxation, altogethe·r. Applicant, the Commonwealth 
and the court below are all agreed that this prppe-rty, even 
if it were considered· (which the Co:mlnonwealth does not 
admit) to be money on deposit, is not subject to tax under 
section 70 of the Tax Code, because it is not money on de-
posit with a bank or other firm "doing a banking business". 
It follows that a.vplicant is seekin_q a co~plete. tail; exemption. 
This clain1 is made in the teeth of the mandate in section 168 
of the Constitution that all·property shall be taxed, and, de-
spite the provisions in section 183 of the Constitution (pre-
scribing what propeTty shall be exempt from taxation) that 
the ''following property and 'J'l<O other shall be exempt from 
taxation." Needless to say, applicant's property is not em-
braced in any class of property exempted by section 183. 
This section of the Constitution further provides that 
19* f" 'general laws n1ay be enacted restricting but ~ot ex-
tending the above exemptions''. - ' 
So far it is believed to have been ·clearly demonstrated 
that both the language of section 69 and the constitutional 
mandate require that it be construed so as to include appli-
cant's property. · ., " · ·· · · · 
The Tax Authorities have Construed Section 69 of the Tax 
Code to Include this Class of Applicant's Property 
and this Construction is Entitled to Great 
Weight. 
The record (R .. , pp. 37-47) shows that the Department of 
Taxation since its organization in 1928 has uniformly held 
that so-called" open account claims, are taxable to the owner 
under section 69 of the Tax Code. Not only so, but the 
Departn1ent has actively attempted to ascertain the exist-
~nce of such clain1s by audits of returns;, and in other ways 
and, when found to exist, has taxed theni~ These claims are 
of n1any kinds and classes, the claim Ji·ere involved being 
simply typical of one of the classes. It if:~ true that the ques .. 
tion of taxing this particular kind of claim was not brought 
to the attention of the Department until 1933, but, when the 
questlon was raised, the Department adhered to its well estab-
lished practice. 11 
20* *''This practical construction given to the laws by 
public officials is P.nt.itled to, and has~ great weight with 
us. City of Norfolk v. Bell, 149 Va. 772,160, 781; South East 
1: 
I 
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Public Service Corp. v. Com., 165 Va.116." Hunton v. Com.7 
16y Va. 229, 242. 
Counsel for the Commonwealth are perfectly well aware 
of the rule that administrative construction of a statute is 
particularly helpful in cases of ambiguity or doubt, and, al-
though there appears no ambiguity or doubt in section 69 
of the Tax Code, the administrative construction is mentioned 
to. demonstrate the consistency of the Department of Taxa-
tion in construing the tax laws as the Constitution and as. 
the Legislature intended they should be construed. This 
administrative construction will be discussed later in con-
nection with a contention made by .~pplicant. 
4. 
The Attorney General has Construed Section 69 oi the Tax 
Code to Include Open Accounts and this Construc-
tion is Most Persuasive. 
Under date of April 9, 1932, the Attorney General of Vir-
ginia expressed the opinion8 to the then counsel for 
21* •the Department of Taxation that open accounts due an 
individual were taxable under section 69 of the Tax 
Code. The opinion in full is as follows : 
"Mr. W. W. Martin, Counsel. 
Department of Taxation, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
"April 9, 1932. 
''Dear Mr. Martin: In re: 8. ,J. TV right. 
"I am. in receipt of your file containing correspondence 
in rP.ference to the taxation of open accounts due to one S. 
J. Wright. 
"1 have always understood that a man's entire estate, in-
cluding demands by way of open account as well as written 
obligations, is subject to taxation. While it is true that the 
provision requiring declarations or notices of motion for 
judgment requires the plaintiff to state that taxes upon the 
evidencP.s of debt sued upon have been paid, and it might 
be construed to eliminate such a requirement where the suit 
NoTE 3: It is proper to state that the present Attorney General was not in 
office at the time of this opinion, nor was the attorney collaborating in the prepara-
tion of this brief connected with the Attorney General's office at that time. 
I 
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is upon open account. the provision of ilaw requiring all~ de-
mands and claims, however evidenced, ]is intended to cover 
obligations due a person, even though t:Pe debt has no tangi-
ble evidence by way of a written instrument. 
I 
''Yours very truly, 
I 
''(Signed) JNO. R. SAUNDERS, 
.Attorney General.'' 
I 
That Attorney General Saunders understood the mandate 
of the Constitution is clear. 
''This construction of the statute by t:Pe Attorney General, 
while in no sense binding upon this court, is of the most per-
suasive character and is entitled to due consideration.'' Bar-
ber v. Danville, 14.9 Va. 41R, 424. 
22* ,..It is submitted that the argument as so far advanced 
demonstrates the correctness of the challenged assess-
ments, hut. in view of the importance :of' the case and the 
large amount of revenue involved, if the judgment of the 
court below is affirmP.d, its opinion will be discussed and re-
ply also made to the principal contention of the applicant. 
B. 
The Opinion of the Court Belo~v. 
The opinion of the court below (R., pp. 68-70) stab~s that 
the pertinent portion of section 69 of th~ Tax Code, reading 
as follows : : 
''All bonds • • "" notes and othP.r evidences of debt • • * 
and all demands and claims, however evidenced, whether se-
cured hy mortgage, deed of trust, jud~¢nt or otherwise, or 
11ot so seeurP.d * * *" · II 
has not beP.n changed since it was a part of the first classi-
fication under section 8 of the Tax Bill bf 1903. · Acts 1902-
3-4 (Extra Session) 158: that what is now section 70 of the 
Tax CQde was the seventh classification! of section 8 of the 
s~me Ta~ Bill and then rP.ad as follows: ji 
"Money on deposit with any bank or other corporation 
or firm or person.'' 
i . 
\ 
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It was not until 1922, says the opinion, that the words 
''doing a banking business'' were added to what is now 
23* *section 70. Acts 1922, 551, 555. Therefore, postulates 
the opinion, fro1n 1903 to 1922 both the Legislature and 
the tax authorities considered credit balances with ·brokers 
taxable as ."money on deposit" and not as a.n "evidence of 
debt'' or as ''demands and claims''. The opinion then rea-
sons that the addition in 1922 of the 'vords ''doing a bank-
ing business'' to that part of the Tax Bill taxing· money on 
deposit did not "chang·e the very definite,. fixed and long 
established meaning of what is now section 69 of the Tax 
Code of Virginia, na1nely, to exclude credit balances whether 
with banks, corporations, firms or businesses from its terms.'' 
In other words, the opinion holds that the effect of the addi-
tion of the words ''doing a. banking business'' to what is now 
section 70 of the Tax Code was to exclude credit balances 
with brokers (and necessarily credit balances with any other 
persons, firms or corporations) from taxation under section 
70. This position necessarily comntits the co~trt to the start-
li1'llg holding that the sole elf ect and purpose of the addition 
of the.c;e four 'words -was to relieve from taxation altogethet· 
credit balancp,s of all kinds (except with banks.) belonging to 
individ~wls. 
The staten1ent in the opinion that credit balances were 
taxed as ."money on dP.posit" from 1903 to 1922 is not sup-
ported by anything· in the record. It represents a mere as-
sumption, and, it is submitted, an erroneous assumption. 
The term "money on deposit" has a well recognized 
24* meaning as *referring to deposits with banks or those 
doing a banking business. The record here shows em- ~ 
phatically that Scott & Stringfellow is not doing a banking 
business and there is no showing that this firm ever did a 
banking business. The difference between the business of 
Scott & Stringfello,v· and the business of a bank is too ap-
parent from the testimony to require repeating. Indeed, the 
statements of account sent out by Scott & Stringfellow con-
tain the express stipulation (Exhibit Pope No. 1) that: 
"It is understood and agreed that any credit balances, 
which may from time to time accrue in any of your accounts, 
are held- by u.s not as deposits but a-s /1ttnds awaiting invest-
'lnent and/or reinvestment in such stocks, bonds and/or com-
tnodities as your discretion may dictate and as market con-
ditions may permit." 
It is reasonable to say, therefore, contrary to the assuntp-
tion of the court below, that formerly credit balances, other 
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than such balances with those doing a b~nking business, were, 
as now, taxable as "demands and cia~". ".· . 
But even if the assumpi'ion of the court that credit balances 
were originally classified as ''money on deposit'' were sup-
ported ·by the facts and the law, a-ny .signijic{Jifl,(Je it might 
otherwise have is co'lnpletely de.c;troyed when it is considered 
that from 1903 to 1914 the rate of taxation on all intangible 
property, including bonds, demands, claims, rp.oney on de~ 
posit, capital and stock, ·was the same. Acts 1902-3-4 (Extra 
. Session) 158, 159, 160. So far as either the taxpayer 
25* *or the State was concerned, it made not an iota of dif-
ference whether credit balances we·re taxed as money on 
deposit or as demands and claims. The opinion completely 
overlooks this fact. 
In 1914 there was passed a general Act (not amendatory 
of the Tax Bill) segregating· money on deposit for State taxa-
tion exclusively and fixing the rate at 20 cents on the hun-
dred dollars. Acts 1914, p. 6. It was not until the passage of 
this Act did it become material under what classification 
money on deposit was reported for taxation. Then came the 
Act of 1922 (Acts 1922, p. 555), not changing, but making 
plain what was already the law, namely that the taxation 
of money on deposit was confined to such money on deposit 
with an institution doing a banking business. The only con-
clusion that the opinion draws from this Act was that its ef-
fect was to eliminate credit balances from taxation alto-
g·ether. That this conclusion is entirely unsound will now 
be shown. 
The far n1ore reasonable hypothesis for this amendment 
of 1922 is that the tax authorities broug·ht to the attention 
of the General AssPmbly the fact that since the Act of 1914, 
seg-reg·ating money for State taxation exclusively and impos-
in~ the low rate of twenty cents, the practice had developed 
of taxpayers reporting· as mon~y on deposit everything that 
could bv anv sb·etch of the imagination :be included in that 
classification, thus getting aclvantf\ge not only of the 
26* *l<~nv. ratP. bnt also escaping entire1,y local taxation O,!l 
tlus Item.'' The purpose of the amendment of 1922, It 
is submitted, was to cure this situation by ~estricting the taxa-
tion of money on deposit to such money as the Legislature 
had always intended to be so taxed, namely, money on deposit 
with institutions doing a banking business, thus automati-
cally requirin~ other moneyed demandsj1 of all sorts to be 
reported, as the Legislature had always intended they should 
I 
NOTE 4: It will be remembered that until 1926 intangible property generally 
was subject to both local and State taxation. l 
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be reported under the classification of demands and cl~ims, 
· in what is now section 69 of the Tax Code. In other words, 
as is frequently the case with amendatory Acts of this char-
acter, it was ,simply declara.to1·y of· existing law. 
The above explanation of thA amendment of 1922 is sup-
ported not only by logical reasoning, but by the consistent 
administrative practice of the tax authorities since 1928. 
The record shows that since the creation of the Departm~1t 
of Taxation it has consistently ruled that all of the many 
kinds of credit balances other than such balances with banks 
are taxable under section 69 of the Tax Code, and has so 
taxed them. There is no reason whatsoever to assume, as 
does the court below, that this practice originated with the 
Department in 1928. On the contrary, the fair· assumption 
is that this was the practice of the tax authorities prior to 
1928. 
27'1 "The fundamental and glaring .error, however, of 
. the court below lies in its treating· the addition in 1922 
of the words ''doing a banking· business'' to what is now sec-
tion 70 of the Tax Code as if it created a tax exemption for 
credit balances other than such balances with banks. The· 
record shows that there are many kinds of such balances 
other than those with brokers (R., pp. 38-45). Among others 
are balances owing by a corporation to its officers, employees 
or stockholders, and proceeds .of insurance policies left with 
an insurance company. These are but typical. Large taxable 
values are involved. In the companion case, heretofore re-
ferred to as pending in the court below, one. Virg·inia tax-
payer had balances with Scott & Stringfellow of $131,097.00, 
$171,000.00 and $77,140.00, respectively, for the years 1935, 
1936 and 1937. Tl1e court construes the statutes involved 
as if the Legislature in 1922 had deliberately freed of all 
taxation this valuable and readily ascertainable property. 
What possible reason or policy of taxation can be advanced 
for this extraordinary exhibition of legislative favor? One 
individual owning a bond or note or somA other demand or 
claim of doubtful value is taxed while an individual having 
a credit balance with a broker, or a corporation, worth one 
hundred cents on the dollar is not taxed. Courts will not 
place such an absurd construction on taxing statutes if it 
can possibly be avoidAd. 
28* 4J' 'When the languag·e ·of an act is susceptible of 
two constructions, one of which grants an exemption 
from taxation and the other does not, or one of which grants 
only a limited exemption and the other a complete exemption 
from taxation, that construction should be adopted which 
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denies or restricts the exemption, unlGss it be very plain 
that the construction which grants a !complete exemption 
was that intended by the legislative body which enacted the 
act. 
'' 'Taxes being the sole means by which sovereignties can 
maintain their existence, any claim on the part of any one 
to be exempt from the full payment of his share of taxes 
on any portion of his property must on that account be clearly 
defined and founded upon plain language. There must be 
no doubt or ambiguity in the language used upon which the 
claim to the exemption is founded. It has been said that a 
well-founded doubt is fatal to the- claim.'· Bamk of Commerce 
v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, * * *." A reese v. :Conunonwealth, 
160 Va. 116, 124. 
The above is peculiarly appropriate in the situation here 
presented, where the court below has construed a statute to 
grant property a complete exemption from taxation in spite 
of the fact that its language plainly includes the property 
in its scope. · 
Equally pertinent is the following· fron1 Hunton v. Com.-
'monwealth, supra, at pag·e 236: 
''Taxation being the rule and exemption therefrom the 
exception, constitutional. and statutory provisions exempt-
ing property from taxation should be strictly construed 
against the exemption and any doubt should be resolved in 
favor of the State. Corn. v. L~lflzchbur.Q Y. M. C. A., 115 Va.. 
745. 747~ 748; Board of Supervisors v. City of Norfolk, 153 
Va. 768; A.1·cese v. Co1n., 160 Va. 116, 124; Ba;nk of Com~merce 
v. Tenne.~see, 161 lJ. S. 1R4, 146. ,. * *'" . 
29* *Not only does the decision of the court offend sec-
tion 16R of the Constitution, but it is equally violative 
of sP.ction 183 of the Constitution, which provides that "the 
f?llowing property and no other shall be:l'. exen1pt fro1n taxa-
tion.'' 
"Under the Constitution of 1869, by section 3 of Article 
X, the legislature had authority to exeinpt certain classes 
of property, but since the Constitution :of 1902 became ef-
fective all tax exemptions are thereby flxed, and there can 
be no otliP.r such exemptions. II 
''The most casual consideration of thi~ section 183 of the 
present 1Constitution shows clearly and i distinctly the pur-
pose of the convention thereafter to rna · e it impossible for 
the legislature to create any exemptions ;from taxation, for 
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it not only provides in detail affirmatively just what prop-
erty may be exempted from taxation, but expressly denies 
the legislature the power to add thereto, and specifically pro-
hibits the exemption of any other property. • • *" Holly-
wood Centetery Co. v. Com1norvwealth, 123 Va. 106, 110. 
The court below also ignores this constitutional provision 
and in addition imputes to the General Assembly an inten-
tion to ignore it, even though the language of that body 
absolutely negatives such an intention. 
It is submitted that the error of the court below was pri-
marily due to considering section 70 of the Tax Code, and its 
predecessor statutes, as if it stood alone. The present Vir-
ginia tax system is a complex structure built up over a pe-
riod of more than a g·enera.tion, a tax system in which the 
classification and segregation of the subjects of taxation are 
the most outstanding characteristics. It must *be con-
30• sidered as a whole. The interpretation of many of its 
provisions and sections is dependent upon other provi-
sions and SP~tions. It is entirely incorrect to say that an 
amendment (•f one section cannot change the meaning of an-
other section, no matter how definitely fixed the meaning of 
the latter section may have been. For example, the classi-
fication ''bonds * * * notes and other· evidences, * • * and all 
demands a.nd clain1s * • * '' in what is now section 69 of the 
Tax Code is amply broad to include money on deposit with a 
bank which is but a form of demand or claim. The relation-
ship of debtor and creditor exists between a bondholder and 
maker just as it does between a bank and a depositor. If it 
were not for section ·70, bank deposits would be taxable un-
der section 69. It follows that, even if it had been the inten-
tion of the Legislature prior to 1922 to allow credit balance 
with other than bm1ks to be taxed as money on deposit, the 
effect of the amendrrwnt of 1922 was to automatically take 
these crPdit balance~ out of the classification of money on de-
posit and restore them to the classification of demand and 
claims and tax them as such. This is the only construction 
that can he adopted which harmonizes not only with the con-
stitutional 1nandate that all property shall be taxed, but with 
the fundamental principle that statutes will not be construed 
to grant complete tax exemption unless it was plainly so in-
tended. 
31 * •The amendment of 1922 furnishes another unusual 
illustration of the faHacv of the view· of the court be-
lo'v that the amendment of what is now section 70 of the Tax 
Code could not affect what is now section 69. The addition 
of the words ''doing· a banking business'' was not. the only 
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chang·e made in 1922. The Legislature dvidently learned that 
some institutions doing, or authorized tp do, a banking busi-
ness were paying more than 5 per cent interest on ~ttain de· 
posits. T.hese deposits were, of course, taxable as money 
on deposit at the low (20 cents per hundred dollars) rate. 
The Legislature, feeling that this property should be taxed 
at the higher rate imposed on demands and claimsJ further 
amended the section taxing money on ~eposit by _addilig the 
words (.Acts 1922, 555) : , · 
"* '* • which (that is, money on deposit) shall include cer-
tificates of deposit of any bank * * .,. be~ring a total interest 
r.ate paid or to be paid not exceeding \five per centum per 
annum :11: :11: a.'' ! 
It is highly significant that- the amended section will be 
searched in vain for anything specifically providing how cer-
tificates of deposit bearin,g more than 5 per cent interest 8hall 
be taxed. All the amendment did on it~ face was to exclude 
thP.m from the classification of ·money ort deposit. The effect 
of this was to automatically restore suQh certificates to the 
classification of ''bonds, * * * notes and other evidences 
32* of debt 41: :11: :~~:and all demai1ds •and c'aims • • *." Adopt-
ing the reasoning of the- court below, however, that the 
an1endment of one section could. ·not aff-ect the meaning or 
another, the effect of the amended section would be to tax 
certificates of deposit bearin.q interest at the rate of 5 pe·r 
cent or less and to exempt fro1n taxation altogether such, 
certificf.!tes 11aying 1no~re than 5 per cent( interest, a 'lnanifest 
a-bs'wrdtty. 
I 
c. 
AtnJUcat1lt 's Principal Contention in :the Court Below. 
Applicant did not raise in t:Qe court lbelow the point" on 
which the opinion rested. Applicant's 4f,ominant contention 
'vas that the demands and claims taxed ~Y section 69 of the 
Tax Code are only such demands and
1 
claims as ar~ .evi-
denced by a 'vritten evidence of debt sig\lled by the debtor-
that. unless there is such a written instrument, no demand 
or claim is taxable unde~ section 69. or tj1 able at all, for it is 
conceded by all parties that only mone 1 on deposit with an 
institution doing· a banking· business is taxable under sec-
tion 70. . i 
The fallacy of applicant's contention is at once seen when 
it is considered that its effect is to giv~ no meaning at all 
I . 
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to the expression ''and all demands and claims''. Written 
instruments are included in ''bonds, notes and other 
33* *evidences of debt". But the statute does not stop there 
-it also taxes "and all demands and claims". This 
group is not preceded by any such word as "other". It is 
a separate class of debts in addition to written instruments 
and it is added by the use of the word "and". The true 
meaning of ''demands and claims'' in the light of other con-
stitutional aird.statutory provisions has already been fully 
discussed and; further elaboration is unnecessary. 
It must not be overlooked that values are taxed-not pieces 
of paper. 'Counsel for the Commonwealth well understand 
that there are manv demands and claims to which it is dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to ascribe a fixed value for purposes 
of taxation, the result being that, while theoretically and 
legally taxable, as a practical matter the tax is nil. This un-
certainty of value may be due to the nature of the clain1s or 
the financial situation of the debtor. But the property here 
involved has a well settled value and is payable on demandr 
Applicant, ignoring the fundamental principle that a person 
shall be taxed in accordance with the value of his property, 
would make the liability to be taxed, in the case of debts, to 
depend entirely on whether or not the debtor had signed a 
piece of paper. At one fell swoop applicant would remove 
from the field of taxation every moneyed den1and, regardless 
of value, not evidenced by a written instrument. To so con-
strue a taxing statute, unless no other construction is 
34* possible, would not only violate •the legal principles 
heretofore discussed, but would result in very real dis-
crimination against that very large class of taxpayers who 
are not so fortunate as to be able to maintain "credit bal-
ances" with brokers or others. According to applicant's 
theory, an open account worth par and bearing 6 per cent 
interest would not be taxed at all, 'vhile a note without in-
terest and of doubtful value would be taxed. 
This court has already conclusively denied applicant's 
contention that, to be taxable as a demand or claim, a debt 
must be evidenced by a written instrument. It has held in 
T~V. Va. Pulp&; Paper Co. v. /( a·rnes, supra, that a claim aris-
ing· out of condemnation of property or out of a tort com-
mitted (obviously not evidenced by a 'vritten instrument) was 
taxable as ''all other :R: * ~ demands and claims.'' The court 
was concerned in that case with the tax on capital of a busi-
ness imposed by what is now section 73 of the Tax Code, but 
surely it cannot be soundly argued that the words ''demands 
and claiins" embracP. only written instruments in section 
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69 of the Tal{ Code and have an entirJly different meaning 
.in section 73. 1l 
Applicant doubtless will attempt to fiustify his construc-
tion of section 69 by the use of technical rules of construction, 
which arP. only to bP. invoked where the meaning of a statute 
is doubtful. As was said by former Chief Justice Prentis in 
Hollywood Cernetery Co. v. Commonwealth, supra, 123 Va. 
106, 110: 
35• *"When the words of Constitutions and of statutes 
are unambiguous and have a clear and definite mean-
ing, indicating their purpose, it is welJ settled that courts 
are not permitted to interpret that which needs no inter-
pretation, and that general rules for the construction of 
statutes of doubtful meaning have no application. If the in-
tention is manifest from the language used and leads to no 
absurd conclusion, courts must give such provisions the ef-
fect clearly intended.'' 
Surely it "leads to no absurd conclusion" to. construe this 
statute in the only way it can be construed to give effect to 
the constitutional mandate that all property shall be taxed. 
Indeed, in view of the lanp;uage of the statute supporting the 
tax here challenged, an ''absurd conclusion'' would be reached 
if this valuable class of property were held to be exempt from 
taxation. 
D. 
Applicant's Contention that he is Denied the Equal Protec-
tion of the [,aw. 
The above contention was not passed on by the court below. 
It has littlP merit. 1 
So far as the Virginia Constitution is concerned, section 
168 exprP8sh· provides that the "Geneiral Assembly may 
define m1cl c]assifv taxable subjects." ~nd in Richm.ond v. 
Dreu~r.lJ-H'UlJhes Co., 122 Va. 178, 195, this court held: 
36~ w, 'There can be no question about the power to tax 
different classes of intangible p~operty at different 
rates. A contrary holding would strike,: a fatal blow to the 
entire plan of taxation a.s established byjjthe General Assem-
bly in 1915 (see section 9 of the tax bill) ~·and would, further-
more, be contrary to the settled law on the subject. * *' * '' 
I 
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Virginia has for many years separately classified for tax 
purposes money on deposit with banks and other credits. 
This classification has never been successfully attacked in 
any reported case. The differences between the banking busi-
ness and the business of a stockbroker are many and obvious. 
Scott and Stringfellow are stockbrokers (R., p. 13). This 
firm doe$ not and ca;nnot engage in the banking busilness. 
These differences clearly justify the separate ·classification of 
bank deposits on the one hand and the indebtedness of a stock-
broker to his customer on the other. Bradley v. Richmond, 
110 Va. 521, affirmed 227 U. S. 477; Richmond Linen Co. v. 
Lynchburg, 160 Va. 644, affirmed 291 U. S. 641; Common-
wealth v. Annour, 118 Va. 242, affirmed 246 U. S. 1; Heisler 
v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245; Oliver Iron Mining Co. 
v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172; State Board of Tax Commissioners v. 
Jackson, 283 U. S. 527. 
CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons stated it is respectfully submitted that the 
pertinent statutes should not be construed so as to 
37* •·exempt from taxation the large class of intangible prop-
erty here involved. 
PRAYER. 
Your petitioner, therefore, prays tl1at a writ of error and 
S'ltpersedeas may be awarded it, in order that such judgment, 
for the causes of e1·ror aforesaid, before you may be caused 
to come, that the whole matter in the said judgment contained 
may be reheard, and that the said judgment may be reversed 
and annulled. 
STATEMENT REQUIRED BY RULE 9. 
Counsel for the Commonwealth of Virginia state that a 
copy of this petition was on the 18 day of February, 1939, de-
livered to opposing counsel in the trial court, and that this 
petition was filed on the 18 day of February, 1939, with the 
Clerk of this Court at Richmond, and, further, that, should 
a writ of error be awarded, this petition is adopted as the 
opening brief on behalf of tl1e Commonwealth. 
ORAL HEARING REQUESTED ON PETITION. 
Counsel for the Commonwealth of :Virginia desire to state 
orally the reasons for reviewing the decision complained of, 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Blair ;B. Stringfellow. 25 
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and respectfully reques·t that an op~ortunity be afforded 
therefor. 
38* *Respectfully submitted, 
001YIMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
at the relation of the State Tax Commissioner. 
By: ABRAl\ti P. STAPLES, 
Abram P. Staples, 
W. W. MARTIN, 
1V. W. Martin, 
Attorney General. 
Assistant, Attorney General. 
Richmond, Virginia, February 18, 1939. 
I, W. W. Martin, an attorney practicing in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my 
opinion there is error in the judgment'· entered on the 23rd 
day of December, 1938, in the Hustings Court of the City 
of R-ichmond, in favor of Blair B. Stringfellow against the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, as set fo1~th in the foregoing 
petition, for which the same should be reviewed by the Su· 
preme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
,W. W. MARTIN. 
W. W. Martin. 
Service of the foregoing petition is hereby accepted this 
18th day of February, 1939. 
HUNTON, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON, 
GAY & MOORE, 
Counsel for Blair B. Stringfellow. 
Received February 18, 1939. 
It 
M. :S. WATTS, Clerk. 
· Received 3/10/39. I 
Writ of error and sztpersedeas grant1f' 
3/10/39. 
Received :l\{arch 10, 1939. 
c. v. s. 
c. v. s. 
M. B. W. 
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RECORD 
STATE ·oF'VIRGINIA, 
City of Richm9nd, to~ wit= 
Pleas at the Courthouse of the City of Richmond, before 
the Hustings Court of the said City, on the 23rd day of 
December, 1938. 
Be it remembered that heretofore, to-wit: At a Hustings 
Court held for the said City at the Courthouse on the 20th 
day of January, 1938, Blair B. Stringfellow filed in said Court 
a Petition against the Commonwealth of Virginia, Defend-
ant, praying certain relief, and that on said day, to-wit, the 
20th day of January, 1938, an order was entered in said 
Hustings Court, docketing said petition and setting same 
for trial, which said petition and order are in the \vords and 
figures following, to-wit: 
page 2 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of l?,ichmond, January 
20, 1938. 
Blair B. Stringfellow, Petitioner, 
v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant .. 
PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF ERRONEOUS AS-
SESS~iENTS OF STATE TAXES AND 
FOR A REFUND. 
To Honorable John· L. Ingram, Judge of said Court: 
Your petitioner, Blair B. Stringfello,v, respectfully repre-
sents that he is aggrieved by the assessment of omitted 
additional state taxes on intangible personal property for 
the years 1934, 19·35 and 1936 made against him by the De-
partment of Taxa.tion, and entitled to have said assessments 
corrected, and that he is further aggrieved by the assessment 
of a state tax on intangible personal property for the year 
1936 made against him by the Commissioner of Revenue of 
the City of Richmond, Virginia, and entitled to have said as-
sessment corrected and to a refund of the tax paid by him 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Blair B,. Stringfellow. 27 
I, 
on account thereof. In support of his pett#on, your petitioner 
shows unto the Court the following facts :i 
First: That your petitioner is, and has been during :the 
entire period involved in this petition, a 1resident of the City. 
of Richmond, ;virginia. I · 
Second: That during said period your petitioner had a 
customer's account with the firm of Scott & Stringfellow, 
which is engaged in the business of a stockbroker in the City 
of Richmond, Virginia, and employed its:. services in the pur-
chase and sale of securities on the New York and 
page 3 } other exchanges and in other matters usually in-
. cident to the relationship of stockbroker and cus-
tomer, and that on J anua.ry 1st of the years hereafter shown 
the firm was indebted to him on open account for the following 
balances standing to his credit in said customer's account for 
the respective years: ' 
1934 . . . . ....................... j •••••••••••••• $16,123.00 
1935 . . . . ............................. ' . . . . . . . . . 15,808.00 
1936 . . . . ............................ ·,. . . . . . . . . 4,470.00 
Third: That your petitioner returned the aforesaid credit 
balances as ~'Money" under Section 70 of the Tax Code for 
the years. in question; that said credit balances ·were a::::scssed 
as ''Money" by the Commissioner of Re~enue of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia, for said years at' the prescribed rate of 
20 cents on the $100, and that your petitioner paid to the State 
of Virginia the following taxes on said!: credit balances as 
''Money'' for the years shown: 
1934 . . . . ........................................ $ 32.25 
1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 31.62 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.94 
Fourth: That on November 10, 1937, \the Department of 
Taxation advised your petitioner that tlie aforesaid credit 
balances had been erroneously returned b~ him as ''Money'' 
for the years 1934-1936, inclusively; that ~aid credit balances 
must be regarded as. "Bonds, Notes, etc. "I taxable at 50 cents 
per $100 under Section 69 of the Tax Code, and that addi-
tional omitted assessments at the latter ~~ate would be made 
against your petitioner for the years 193~ 1935 and 1936. 
Fifth: That on N ovmnber 19, 1937, the l))epartment of Tax-
ation made the following omitted assessments against your 
. . petitioner on account of said creBit balances for the 
page 4 } years and iu the amounts showrt : 
. I 
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1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47.42 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.41 
said omitted assessments representing a tax of 50 cents per 
$100.00 on said credit balances as "Bonds, notes, etc.", under 
Section 69 of the Tax Code, less the taxes already paid there-
on by your petitioner as "]\lfoney" at the rate of 20 cents 
per $100. 
Sixth: That at no time has your petitioner held any bond, 
note or other evidence of indebtedness of Scott & String-
fellow to him on account of said credit balances; that your 
petitioner is advised and therefore alleges that the aforesaid 
balances are open account claims against Scott & Stringfellow 
and that they are not bonds, notes or other evidences of debt 
within the classification set forth in Section 69 of the Tax 
Code; that if said Section 69 should be so construed as impos-
ing a tax of 50 cents per $100 on said open account claims 
it would be void in that it would violate the uniformity pro-
visions of Section 168 of the Constitution of the State of Vir-
ginia and deny to your petitioner the equal protection of the 
law in violation of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, and that your petitioner 
is entitled to l1ave the aforesaid additional omitted assess-
ments in the sums of $48.36, $47.42 and $13.41, made against · 
hiin by the Department of Taxation for the years 1934, 1935 
and 1936, respectively, corrected and expunged from the tax 
records. 
Seventh: That your petitioner is advised, and therefore 
alleges, that the Department of Taxation is correct in its rul-
ing that the said credit balances are not taxable as "Money" 
under Section 70 of the Tax Code; that . your petitioner 
erroneously returned said credit balances as money for the 
· years in question; that said credit balances were 
page 5 ~ erroneously· assessed as "~Ioney" in said yea1·s by 
. the Comn1issioner of Revenue for the City of Rich-
mond, Virginia, that said credit balances are not, for the 
reasons heretofore stated, taxable under Section 69 of the 
Tax Code and are not taxable under any other statute of the 
State of Virginia, and that your petitioner is entitled to 
have the said assessment made against said credit balance 
as '' l\foney" for the year 1936 corrected and expunged from 
the tax: rer-ords and to a: refund of the aforesaid sum of $8.94 
paid by him on aceount of the said assessment for the year 
19B6. 
Eig-hth: That acting in pursuance with Section 407 of the 
Tax Code, your petitioner, on December 17, 1937, filed with the 
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Department of Taxation the written alpplication for a cor-
rection and refund, dated December 16, \1937, of whi® .A copy 
is hereto attached marked "Exhibit A'~, and made..S. part ·of 
this petition, and that the Department of Taxation has taken 
no final action with respect to said applihation and has agreed 
to take no action thereon until the issues 'raised in this petition 
have been finally disposed of by the Court of last ~esort. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioner prays that th~ aforesaid 
omitted additional assessments of $48.86, $47.42 and $13.41 
made against him by the Department :of Taxation for the 
years 1934, 1935 and 1936, respectively, inay be corrected and 
expunged from the tax records; that the aforesaid assess-
ment of $8.94 made against him by the Commissioner of Reve· 
nue of the City of Richmond, Virginia, for the year 1936 may 
be corrected and expunged from the tax records; that the 
Court may direct a refund of the aforesaid sum of $8.94 paid 
by him on account of said assessment, and that your 
page 6 ~ petitioner may have such other and further relief 
as may be proper in the premises. 
BLAIR B. STRINGFELLOW, 
By HUNTON, WILLIAMS, ANDERSON, 
GAY & lVIOORE, 
His Counsel. 
January 20, 1938. 
Service of a copy of the within petition upon the State Tax 
Commissioner, on the 20th da;y of January, 1938, is· hereby 
acknowledged by the undersigned, who has been designated by 
said Commissioner to defend the same £or the Commonwealth 
of Virginia. 
W. W. MARTIN, 
Asst. Attorney General. 
EXHIBIT A. 
II 
page 7 }- ~ecember 16, 1937. 
I 
Re. Blair B. Stringfellow. 
I 
State Department of Taxation, 
Richmond, Va. 
Gentlemen: i 
The undersigned hereby makes applic~tion for the correc .. 
I 
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tion of the omitted assessments made against him by the De-
partment i)'f November 20, 1937. The following tabulation 
shows: {1) the year for which said omitted assessment was 
made, (2) the amount of the credit balance on hand with 
Scott & Stringfellow on January 1st of the year in question~ 
(3) the tax paid on said balance as "Money", and (4) th~ 
amount of said omitted additional tax assessed on said balance 
as '"'Bonds, Notes, Etc." 
(1) 
1934 
1935 
1936 
(2) 
$16,123 
15,808 
4,470-
(3) 
$32.25 
31.62 
8.94 
(4) 
$48.36 
47.42 
13.41 
The undersigned makes further application for a correction 
of the assessments of his 1935 credit balance as "Money", 
and for a ref1md of the tax of $8.94 paid by him on account 
thereof. 
Yours very truly, 
BLAIR B. STRINGFELLOW, 
by I-IUNTONt WILLIAMS, AND·ERSON, 
GAY & MOORE, 
His Atto:r:neys. 
page 8 ~ Virginia = 
In the Hustings Court of the City of Ricl1mond, Jan. 20t 1938. 
Blair B. Stringfellow, Petitioner, 
'0. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant. 
ORDER. 
This day came Blair B. Stringfellow, by his attorneys, and 
presented to the Court his .petition for the correction of 
erroneous assessments of state t_axes on intangible personal 
property for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, and for a refund 
of a state tax paid by him on account of an erroneous assess-
ment against intangible personal property for the year 1936, 
and it appearing from the said petition that service of a copy 
thereof upon the State Tax Commissioner has been acknowl-
edged by V-l. W. Martin, Esq.t Assistant Attorney General, 
the attorney designated by said Commissioner to defend the 
I 
Commonwealth of 'Tirginia v. Blair~· Stringfellow. 
John C. Goode. I 
i 
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petition for the Commonwealth of .Virg~ia, it is ORDERED 
that the said petition be and the sam~ is hereby filed and 
docketed, to be set for hearing at som~ future date. 
page 9 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond. 
And now at this day, to-wit. At a: like Hustings Court 
held at the Courthouse in the City Hall, on the 23rd day of 
December, 1938, the following order: and "Memorandum 
Opinion'' was· entered and filed, which said order and 
opinion are in the words and figures following, to-wit: 
page 10 ~ VIrginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City, of Richmond. 
Blair B. Stringfellow 
v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Before Hon. John L. Ingram, Judge. 
Richmond, Virginia, April 18, 1938. 
PJ;esent: Messrs. Hunton, William~; Anderson, Gay & 
1\ioore (Irvin G. Craig, Esq. and Eppa Hunton IV, Esq.), 
Counsel for petitioner. 1 
W. W. l\1artin, Esq., Assistant Atto;rney General, Coun-
sel for the Commonwealth. ' 
page 11 ~ JOHN C. GOODE, ! 
a witness called on behalf of the petitioner and 
being first 'duly sworn, testified as follbws: 
Examined by Mr. Craig: ! 
Q. 1\tJ:r. Goode, state your positio;n, ~f you please Y 
A. Commissioner of Revenue of the Qity of Richmond. 
Q. Did ~fr. Blair B. Stringfellow, t~e petitioner in this 
proceeding, file his intangible return with the State of Vir-
ginia for 1936 in your office Y · 11 - , 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did his return show money in th~ sum of $4,470 f 
A. I think that is correct, accordingj to the return. 
Q. Was that sum assessed as money! 
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Thomas D. Neal. 
: A. 1res, sir. 
~Ir. Craig: It is stipulated that the $4,470 returned_by the 
petitioner as money was taxed as money and that a tax of 
$8.94 wa.s paid thereon. 
By Mr. Craig: 
. Q. Are you conversant with the fact that in this proceeding 
Mr. Stringfellow's petition asks for the refund of this $8.94 
which was paid? 
A. I le~rned that information this morning. 
Q. Are you also familiar with the fact that the petition 
of Mr. Stringfellow is being defended by V·l. W. Martin, Esq.,· 
attorney designated by the Tax Commissioner Y 
A. I assume that is correct. 
Q. You see Mr. Martin lined up for active de-
page 12 ~ fense, do you not? 
A. 1res, sir. 
Q. Is it the policy of your office in such case to leave the 
defense of these matters to the broad shoulders of counsel 
designated by the Tax Department' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Is there anything that you wish to say in your role as 
Commissioner of Revenue touching upon this application? 
A. I know of nothing. 
THOMAS D. NEAL, 
a witness called on behalf of the petitioner and being first 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by ~Ir. Craig: 
Q. Will you state your name, age, and present occupation Y 
A. Thomas D. Neal; 47; partner of Scott & Stringfellow, 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Q. How long have yon been connected with the firm of Scott 
& Stringfellow T 
A. Since the early part of 1919. 
Q. Has the business during that whole period been oper-
ated as a partnership? · 
A. It has. 
page 13 ~ Q. What is the nature of the business of the 
firn1 of Scott & Stringfellow? 
A. We are members of the Ne'v York Stock Exchange and 
other exchanges and onr principal business is that of stock 
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broker. We also pa:rti~ipate in national.syndi~tes to retail 
various securities. 
Q. Has the firm been licensed as a stock broker by the State 
of Virginia and the City of Richmond for a long period of 
time? · I 
A. It has, yes. 
Q. Has it been so licensed since December, 19337 
A. We have been paying the regular stock broker's license 
which is a license that the taxing autpo:dties have placed 
upon us. 
Q. Is Mr. Blair B. Stringfellow, the petitioner here, in any 
'vay connected with the firm of Scott & Stringfellow? · 
A. Only as a customer. 
Q. Has he been a customer with the firm for a long period 
of time? 
A. Mr. Stringf.ellow was a former partner in the firm and 
retired several years ago, and when he terminated his part~ 
nership he almost immediately became a pure customer of the 
:firm and has since been a customer of the :firm. 
Q. Did he terminate his partnership with the :firm and be-
come a customer of the firm prior to January 1, 
page 14 ~ 19337 
A. Several years ·prior thereto. 
Q. Where does Mr .. Stringfellow reside? 
A. 1105 West Franklin Street, Richmond, Virginia. 
Q. l-Ias he lived there since January, 1~1933? 
A. Yes, for several years prior. 
Q. Where is ~fr. Stringfello'v at the present time Y 
... 'l.. Mr. Stringfellow has been suffering from pyorrhea of 
the teeth and he has had to have a great many of his teeth 
extracted and it l1as weakened him considerably and the doc-
tors have kept him in bed almost entirely for the last two 
months. 1 
Mr. Craig: It is stipulated between cdpnsel that Mr. Neal 
shall represent 1\Ir. Stringfello'v in this !'proceeding and we 
shall proceed with the hearing without the petitioner himself 
being actually present. 
Q. Are you familiar with the petition 1~1 for correction and 
refund which Mr. Stringfellow has filed ·n this Court? 
A.Iam. 1 
Q. Are .you familiar with the matters r· hich are set forth 
in the petition? . 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Do you have with yon the. original account of Scott & 
Stringfellow with Mr. Stringfellow covering the period 
Jan nary 1, 1933, to date Y 
A. Yes. 
page 15 ~ Q. Will yon explain, in a general way, the sev-
eral classes of transactions which are reflected as 
credits and debits in the firm's account with this custon1er, 
taking first the credit items. . 
A. Commencing with J anua.ry, 1933, this account shows 
a credit of various dividends to his account, such dividends 
coming from stock which Mr. Stringfellow owned, which stock 
was registered in the name of Scott & Stringfello,v, Scott & 
Stringfellow merely acting as a collecting agency for the 
dividends from the company and crediting them to 1\tir. String-
fellow's account. Those credits of dividends will follow along 
perio~ically throughout the year or yea~s, as ~he case ma.y be. 
Then 1n February I see a sale of 50 International Harvester 
and the proceeds of that are credited to his account. A few 
days later there was another sale which is credited to his 
account, and so on throughout the year 1933. On January 
3rd, 1933, I see a charge to Mr. Stringfellow's account of 
$500 which reads that we have deposited $500 to the credit 
of his wife in the uptown branch of the State-Planters Bank 
& Trust Company. That simply indicates a withdrawal from 
his account of $500 and instead of his making the actual de-
posit to his wife's account, we just made it for his convenience. 
Q. Is that type of debit recurrent throughout. the whole 
accountf 
A. That appears pretty regularly, and the same entry on 
February 1st and l\farch, April, and so forth. That 
page 16 ~ appears to be a monthly charge. Then on January 
6th I see a charge against the account of $25 for 
cash. . He evidently ran short of cash and asked us to give 
him $25 out of the petty cash drawer and we charged his 
account with it. 
Q. Referring to the general items of credit which appear 
to his account, as I understand it, you have stated tha.t divi-
dends from securities and proceeds from the sale of securi-
. ties appear in the account and that they are recurrent 
throughout the entire account for· the several year periods 
that yon have before you f 
A. That is right. 
Q. Would the account also show recurrent credits on ac-
count of interest on bonds or securities T 
A. Yes, it would where he had any bonds which 'vere in 
I.· 
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coupon form. :Nir. Stringfellow did not own many bonds as 
a rule but here is an item of a purcha~e on March 15th of 
$10,000 Treasury Certificates of Indebtedness. 
Q. As I understand it, wherever he had bonds in the cus-
tody of the firm, the interest on those bonds would be col-
lected by the firm and credited to his account¥ 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And such an item would be recurrent throughout the 
whole account¥ 
A. Such an item would be recurrent throughout the whole~ 
account. 
page 17 ~ Q. Did Mr. Stringfellow ever place money with 
the :firm for investment f 
A. Yes, he would. 
Q. As I understand it, that would be nwney that would 
come from other sources than from the returns on securities 
that he had with you; is that correct? 
A. Well, yes. For instance, l1e would occasionally deposit 
with us for investment the checks which he received directly 
from companies on securities, representing dividends on those 
securities, and he would build up his investment funds with 
these dividends. Of course, the account also showed periodi-
cally various charges for interest whenever the account was 
a debit balance. 
Q. Am I correct that this item of a sum spent for the pur-
chase of securities for the customer's account is also a typical 
and recurrent item throughout the whole account that you 
have before you f 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. You have mentioned two types of withdrawal from the 
moneys held to the credit of 1\ir. Stringfellow. One was a de-
posit made for the account of his wife, I believe you said, in a 
west cud bank, and the other a withdra'wal he made at the 
firm's place of business. Are there any other types 
page 18 ~ of withdrawals that are char&cteristic and recur-
rent through the account? r 
A. No, that seems to be the typical 'withdrawal. Some-
times those withdrawals were deposited 'to his credit in his 
bank account and someti1nes they were deposited to his wife's 
credit. They were periodical withdrawals from the account. 
Q. ·Were the 'vithdrawals ever made blY a check drawn on 
the firm by the customer? 1 
.li.. By his check drawn on the firm? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No. 
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Q. Wherever any deposit was m~de to the credit of an-
other party, covered by a withdrawal from Mr. Stringfellow's 
account, it was done at his direction, as I understand itt 
A. Yes, done on his instructions. 
Q. Are the transactions which you have described, as shown 
in Mr. Stringfellow's account, typical of those had· by the 
firm with its customers; I mean typical in a general way, 
not in specific detail? 
A. Yes, they are, to the extent of th~ usual debits and 
·credits for the purchase and sale of securities. They are also 
typical to the extent of the account carried by the larger cus-
tomers. The practice has been built up over a long period 
of years and these 'vithdrawals of 1noneys periodically, in most 
cases, simply represent the withdrawal of dividends which 
have accumulated in the account on account of th~ 
page 19 ~ stock being carried in the broker's name on the 
transfer books of the company and the withdrawals 
are just simply a means of getting the moneys into the hands 
of the real owner of the stock. 
Q. Mr. Neal, did the firm ever accept from Mr. Stringfellow, 
or any other custon1er, a deposit for the purpose of deposit 
and subsequent witl1drawal on check or draft 1 · 
A. Prior to the Glass-Stegall Bill I don't know what they 
were called, but following the effective operation of the; Glass-
Stegall Bill, upon advice of our attorneys, we notified our 
customers that all sums accepted by us would .be accepted 
for investment only. 
Q. Prior to that thne had you ever, as I framed my previous 
question, accepted a deposit for the pure purpose of the sub-
sequent withdrawal by check or draft and not initially ten-
dered for future investment? 
A. No. Everything deposited there or placed there was 
primarily for investment purposes. · 
Q. If, prior to the enactment of the Glass-Stegall Bill, a 
customer had made a request for withdrawal, it was a de-
parture fron1 the original purpose of having left tha,t money 
there for investment purposes, was it not? . 
A. It was due to a change of mind on his part from the 
original purpose for which he had placed the funds there. 
Q. And, as I understand your statement, af the 
page 20 ~ present time the firm talres these sums from cus-
tomers, like you say Mr. Stringfellow put them 
there, for the purpose of future investment Y 
A. That is correct. An account with Scott & Stringfello'v 
is really an individual's typical investment account. He keeps 
Commonwealth of Virginia v. Blair l3· Stringfell~. 
Thomas D .. Neal. \' 
37 
I I , 
I 
a checking account in a commercial bank; and p·ays his current 
bills from that account and he keeps h~s other moneys with 
an investment broker in an endeavor td keep his investment 
funds separate from his current checlcing funds. 
Q. Did tbe firm pay Mr. Stringfellow, or any other cus· 
tomer, interest on those credit balances after the effective 
date of the Glass-Stegall Bill, prohibiting payment of interest, 
on June 16, 19331 · 
A. We stopped paying interest at the 1 effective date of the 
BUI. 
Q. Was the reason that yon stopped paying interest on 
customers' credit balances the fact that 'On a bank deposit a 
customer could not get interest on demand deposits? 
A. The reason was that we thought 1 the payment of in-
terest would be in violation of the spidt of the law. 
Q. And no interest has been paid on customers' credit 
balances sine~ that time? · 
A. No. 
Q. Did the firm keep Mr. Stringfellow's credit balances, 
or those of any of the other customers, in any spe· 
page 21 }- cial fund or account t , 1 • 
A. ·No, it did not. 
Q. How were they lmpt? 
A. Well, the money of the :firm was just mingled in one 
account as money. It may be deposited in several banks 
but' .the credit balances of the customers~ as they have come 
in, have been deposited in the various bank accounts and as 
purchases of various securities for those customers have been 
made the checks have been drawn on those accounts. 
Q. Is that generally the way a broker handles credit 
balances of customers? 
A. Yes, that is general practice in a brokerage business. 
Q. That practice was fully known to Mr. St'ringfellowt 
.l\. Oh, yes. 11 Q. Would I be correct in saying then !that this customer, 
1\fr. Stringfellow, had what you would chatracterize as an open 
account cl~!m ag~inst. the firm !n the ~Diount of the balance 
shown to his c.redit at any particular tim~ f 
A. Yes. • 
Q. Did he hold any security for that ~ebt other than the 
' solvency of the firm? 1\ 
· A. No, he did not. . 
Q. Did he hold any bond or note from :the firm evidencing 
his balance at any particular time' i 
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page 22} A. No. . 
Q. Mr. Neal, will you refer to ~Ir. Stringfellow 1s 
account and st~t~. the amount of credit balance, if any, that 
was shown to his .. a.ccount on January 1, 1934? 
A. On that date there is a credit balance of $16,123.50. 
Mr. Craig: It is stipulated that at this point there shall 
be filed, .as Exbibits Neal Nos. 1 and 2, respectively, blank 
forms of returns of intangible personal property with the 
state of Virginia for the years 1934 and 1937, respectively1 
it being agreed that the forms for the years 1935 and 1936 
were the same as for the year 1934. 
' Q. i hand yon the original return of intangible personal 
property made by Blair B. Stringfellow with the State of 
Virginia for the year 1934 and ask yon to state whether the 
credit balance to which yon have referred was reported on· 
that return and, if so, how?. 
A. It is reported under the classification of "Money", the 
parts filled in being" Bank" and then the figures "$16,123.50" 
appearing in the column headed "In this State". 
Q. Did Mr. Stringfellow pay the tax on that credit balance 
as money and, if so, in what amount? · 
A. Yes, he paid the tax as money and the tax was $32.25. 
Q. ~That was Mr. Stringfellow's credit balance, if any, witl~ 
the firm on Jan nary 1st, 1935 f 
page 23 ~ A.' His credit balance on that date was $15,-
808.46. 
Q. I hand you the original of Mr. Stringfellow's intan-
gible personal property return to the State of Virg·inia for 
19357 and ask if that credit balance 'vas reported, and if so, 
howY 
A. That credit balance was reported under the classific-ation 
of'' Money';, the figures appearing on the line 'vhich is printed 
"Total money on deposit" and the. figures falling in the 
column which is headed "In this State". 
Q. What was Mr. Stringfellow's credit balance, if any, 
with the firm on Jan nary 1st, 1936 T 
A. His credit balance on that date was $4,470. 
Q. I hand you tl1e original return of intangible personal 
property which Mr. Stringfellow made to the State of Vir-
ginia for the year 1936 and ask you if that credit balance 
is reported on that return and, if so, how¥ 
A. That credit balance is reported under the classification 
of "Money',, the return simply stating "Ricl1moud, Vir-
ginia", and then the figures ''$4,470" appearing in the colmnn 
which is headed "In this State". 
I 
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· Mr. Craig: It is stipulated between c9unsel that the credit 
balances for the three years, 1934, 1935 !and 1936 which have 
been referred to by the witness were assessed as money at 
the rate of 20 cents a hundred and that the tax-
page 2~ ~ payer paid the follo~ing taxes for those respective 
years upon the cred1t balances: 
1934--$32.25 
1935-$31.62 
1936---4 8.94 
It is further stipulated and agreed that on November 20, 
1937, the Department of Taxation gav~ notice to the tax-
payer of its assessment against him of ~e three above men-
tioned credit balances under the classification of ''Bonds, etc.'' 
at the rate of 50 cents per $100, that onlthe basis of this as-
sessment the aforesaid credit balances were assessed for the 
respective years as ''Bonds, etc.'' : 
1934--$80.61 
1935-$79.04 
1936-$22.35 
which involved additional assessments of $48.36, $47.42 and 
$13.41 for those three years, respective~y. 
Mr. ~{artin: I would like the record 'to show where they 
were assessed as ''Bonds. etc.'' on the bil~, they were assessed 
as ''Bonds, etc.'' as defined by section 69 of the Tax Code. 
I 
page 25 ~ By Mr. Craig : 
Q. Did Mr. Stringfellow pay these additional as-
sessments 'vhich were made against him by the Department 
of Taxation or did he file a petition withl1 \the Department for 
their correction f . ! 
A. No, ~Ir. Stringfello'v did not pay the assessments. but 
informed the Department of Taxation th~t it was his purpose 
to bring a suit in an effort to test the co;rrectness of the D·e-
partnient 's ruling and he asked the n:epart;ment to 'vith-
hold the collection of the assessment during the pendency of 
that suit. · · II 
Mr. Craig: It is stipulated by coun~el that the writing 
'vhich is :filed as Exhibit A with the original petition in this 
proceeding is a true copy of a letter which was addressed by 
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:Mr .. Stringfeilow's attorney to the Department of Tax·atlon 
iii connection with the petition for correction, and it is fur-
ther stipulated that the Department h_as agreed that that pe-
tition shall lie pending the ultimate decision upoh the issues 
that have been joined in this proceeding. · 
GROSS EXAMINATION. 
By Mr. Martin: ~ _ 
Q. 1\Ir. Neal, I believe you stated Scott & Stringfellow 
. carry on their books an account with Mr. Blair B. 
page 26 ~ Stringfellow? 
.A. That is correct. 
Q. An account, as you have described it; in some detail Y 
A~ Yes~ 
'Q• That account is headed exactly what oil tlie books? 
A. "Mr. B. B. Stringfello"T·" 
Q. That is the Blair B. Stringfellow involved in this suit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that account shows at any time the balahce, if any, 
due ~Ir. Stringfellow by Scott & Stringfello\v~ I mean the 
amount can be ascertained at any time from that account'? 
A. Not entirely so. As a general r~le it could be but in 
the broket'age business there is a date of execution of an order 
and a date of settlement of an oi·der, so that the account 
itself on a certain day tnight not show the exact relationship 
with the client, due to the fact tha.t there might be certain sales 
or purchases which had been n1ade or executed but which l1ad 
not been settled for. 
Q. But, generally speaking, it does show the balance due? 
A. Generally speaking, it does. 
Q. Unless there happens to be a sale or purchase on a 
particular day, in which case there might be some question 
of a day or so before final settlement was made for that ·sale; 
is that correctt 
page 27 ~ A. Qorrect. . 
Q. The account of ~lr. Stringfellow did show on 
J.ant1ary 1st oftlje years in que,stionhere, that. is _January 1st, 
1934, 1935 and 1936, the a.tnoWnt due Mr. Stringfellow by 
8cott & Stringfellow? 
A. Yes, barring any inaccuracies. 
Q. I understand that: That is correct, is it not' 
A. Tha.t is correct. 
Q. Would that account be paid by Scott & Stringfellow 
to ~ir. Stringfello\v at any time he 'demanded itf 
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A. Yes. I 
Q. At his request they would pay him the balance shown 
to be due by your books at any time 7 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you stated that no intetest has been 'allowed 
on these _balances subsequent to the effective date of the Glass"' 
Stegall Act; is that correct? 
A. That is co·rrect. 
Q. I am not certain myself but my hnpressl.on is that the 
effective date of that Act was 1933. Is that your impression!. 
1\tir. Craig: June 16, 1933. 
A. I am not certain on that. I think the effective d·a;te 
of the Act was one year from the legal date of the Act. 
page 28 }- By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Some time. in 1933? . . . 
A. I thinl~ it 'vas passed in '33 but did~ not become effective 
·until Jt1ne, i934. · 1 
Q. No interest has been paid on customers, balances since 
that time·? 
A. No. 
Q. V\7 as interest paid ·prior to that time on customers' 
balances? 
A. It was. 
Q. At what rate would it be paid oil an acoo'tint such as 
Mr. Stringfellow's Y . 
A. Well, the rate would vary ·with existing conditions at 
that time, the existing money conditiotis. For instance, in 
1932 I see where we credited him with interest at one per cent 
and then in 1farch, 1933, interest at one and one-half per cent. 
Q. Interest was paid at varying rates prior to the effective 
dar. 0.: c~~c Glass-Stcgall Act? . II 
Q. I presume depending upon the mon~y marke"t l 
A. That is correct. !' 
Q. W oulcl interest be charged on a:t,\y debit balanc~ of 
the customer? 
A. It 'vould, yes. I[ 
page 29 ~ Q. And that is true both n~w and before 19?3? 
A. That is true, ·yes. In tlie years in question 
his accot1nt is principally a credit but on the fe~ occasions 
it did run debit he was charged interest on the debit balance. 
I 
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Q~. And I presume at varying rates, depending on the· money 
marketY 
A. That is right. 
Q. Scott & Stringfellow, during the years in question, have 
not been authorized to do or have not done a banking business ; 
is that correct? . . 
A. They have· no authority from the State Banking De-
partment and any authority that they have is simply by vir-
tue of some old law standing on the statute books prior to 
the passage of the State Banking Act. 
Q. You are speaking of the Virginia law no,vf 
A. Yes. 
Q. I mean as a matter of fact they have not done any bank-
ing business since January 1, 1934 Y 
A. No. 
Q. I believe a.t one time Scott & Stringfellow were au-
thorized to do a banking business as a private banker 1 Is 
that your understanding? 
A. Well, I don't know when the practice started but when 
I first went to work for the firm our letterheads and signs 
read ''Bankers and brokers'' and the letterheads 
page 30 ~ and signs have continued to read that w-ay until 
this Glass-Stegall Bill made it necessary for us to 
change them to the words ''Investment Bankers and 
Brokers''. 
Q. But you have been informed, have yon not, that Scott 
& Stringfello'v was one of the more or less limited group 
that was authorized to do the business of a private banker? 
A. That was my impression. I don't know wllen it was 
started. During my experience with the firm the firm never 
has carried accounts which were purely checking accounts. 
Our customers have almost universally regarded the fund~ 
there as investment accounts. They occasionally drew drafts 
on their account when they were away on a trip and those 
drafts were honored. 
Q. I understand that. I don't mean to suggest that Scott 
& Stringfellow are now doing a banking business. I was · 
simply trying to bring out at one time they did belong to a 
classification known as private bankers and that is your in· 
formation too, is it notY 
Mr. Craig: If your Honor please, I object to this line 
of questioning, not because I object to having the testimony 
come in but because it is obviously a legal question and he is 
asking a witness for an opinion on a legal question. I might 
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say on the question of whether or not Scott & Stringfellow 
was doing a banking business during tlie period involved in 
this petition, the petitioner ~as stated in his pe-
page 31 ~ tition, on advice of counsel, t}lat Scott & S'tringfel-
low was not doing a banking :business during that 
period and that he is entitled to a refund 'on account of the tax 
paid on the credit balances as money because it was not tax-
able under Section 70 of the Tax Code, imposing a tax on 
money on deposit in a bank or in the possession or under the 
control of' the owner. I think the record has been seriously 
confused by interrogating the witness on legal questions. 
Mr. ~Iartin: I was asking him whether he was a private. 
banker. That is not a question of law. He can testify he is 
a broker. 
The Court: I will overrule the objection. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. My question was whether or not at one time Scott & 
Stringfellow belonged to a group of similar partnerships au-
thorized to engage in business as private bankers. If you do 
know, say so f 
A. Several years baek, in discussing the question, I was 
infprmed by someone, I don't know whom, that when the firm 
started it fell in a classification of private bankers and 
brokers, which was a classification that was evidently fixed, 
for taxing purposes, back in the 1890's-· 
Mr. Craig: I renew my objection. 
The Court: Objection overruled. It, is admitted for the 
purpose of finding out all I can about the history 
page 32 ~ of brokers. 
~ir. Craig: I save the poil~t. 
Mr. Craig: The petitioner rests. vq:e have available, at 
the request of ~Ir. Martin, Mr. Pope, oipce manager for the 
firm of Scott & Stringfellow, to be interrogated by the defend-
ant. ' 
w. M. POPE, I 
a· witness called by the defendant and be~ng first duly. sworn, 
testified as follows : Ji . 
I 
Examined bv !1:r. Martin : 
Q. What is your name and occupation~ 
A. W. M. Pope, Office Manager, Scott.& Stringfellow. 
44 ~upreme Court' of Appeals of Virginia 
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Q. You are familiar with the books of the partnership Y 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The evidence shows that there was a credit balance on 
the books of the partnership in favor of 1\fr. Stringfellow 
for certain amounts as of January 1, 1934, January 1, 1935, 
and January 1, 1936. Did the partnership send to 1\{r. String-
fellow by mail or give to 1\{r. Stringfellow from time to time 
a statement of his account showing the credit balance, if any'\ 
A. Yes, the firm gave the statement to Mr. 
page 33 ~ Stringfellow. 
Q. Throughout the period involved here, periodi-
cally throughout the period involved? 
A. During that period. 
Q. About how often were statements of his account given 
to him? 
A. Those staten1ents were rendered, I think, every month. 
Q. At the end of each month? 
A. At the end of each month. 
Q. The statement would have been given to him showing 
his balance as of December 31st of each year~ 
A. He would have received his statement as of December 
31st. 
Q. Showing the credit balance as of that date~ 
A. Showing whatever credit balance he had. 
Q. Have you with you a form of statement on which you 
gave him such a statement of that account? 
A. Yes, sir, this is the form. 
Q. This is the form that was in use from January 1, 1934, 
to date? 
A. Yes, sir, with possibly a minor change in the ''"'ording 
up in the right-hand corner but the form is substantially the 
same. 
Q. And this is a form with the balance due, if any, shown 
thereon that was given to Mr. Stringfellow as of 
page 34 ~ December 31st of each year Y 
A. That would be handed to Mr. Stringfellow 
when l1e would call for it some time after December 31st .. 
Q. The balance as of December 31st? 
A. The balance as of December 31st. 
Q. WiU .you introduce that as Exhibit Pope No. 1? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. The balance as of December 31st would be the same a!3 of 
tTanuary 1st, would it not, January 1st being a holiday¥ 
A. That would be the same for tax purposes, as I under-
stand it. Of course, the balance would change perhaps on 
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January 1st. 
Q. How could it change on January 1st? 
A. Well, if the customer would have credits, if he were to 
bring in a check on the 1st of J anua.ry, we would perhaps 
credit it to his account. :However, January 1st is a· holiday: 
and no brokerage transactions would take place. 
Q. To be specific, the balance as of December 31st would 
be the same as the balance one minut~ after midnight of 
December 31st? · 
A. That is correct. 
page 35 ~ CROSS. EXAMINATiqN. 
By Mr. Craig: 
Q. ].{r. Pope, you say you gave these eopies o:f statemenfs 
of account to ].{r. Stringfellow. Will you state what you 
mean by ''gave them to him', f 
A. Well, 1\{r. Stringfellow would come down to the office 
usually on January 2nd, January 1st being a holiday, and 
'vould call for his mail and we would hand the statement to 
him. 
Q. He would never then have the statement of account 
111 his hand on January 1st of these sev~ral years? 
A. I don't recall that 1\tir. Stringfellow· has ever come into 
the office on January 1st. 
RE-DIRECT EXA1\1INATION. 
By Mr. 1\!artin : 
Q. 1\!Ir. Stringfello'v could have gotten a statement on 
January 1st if he desired it, could he not? 
A. That would have been available had the office been 
open. Frequently we close the office on i anuary 1st. 
page 36 ~ HENRY R. MILLER, .J., 
a witness called on behalf of !:the defendant and 
being first duly sworn, testified as follo"1s : 
,. 
Exnn1ined by Mr. Martin: 
Q. You are Henry R. !filler, Jr.? ~· ~. 1res, sir. I 
Q. What is your connection with the S ate D·epartment of 
Taxation~ 
~. I have charge of tl1e Individual Division of the Depart~ 
ment. 
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Q. How long have yon been connected with the Depart-
ment in that capacity? · 
A .. In that capacity since June, 1934. 
Q. W'hat'was your connection with the Department before 
June, 1934 f· 
A. As Assistant Counsel, sometimes designated as such 
since 1928, having the duties of assisting the counsel, Mr. 
:Martin and others in connection particularly w·ith 'vork of 
the Individual Division. 
Q. Under the set-up of the Department of Taxation, fro~ 
the time you came with it until June, 1934, counsel for the 
Department was in charge of the Individual Division, was 
he not? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were, in your capacity as Assistant Counsel,. 
also assistant in charge of the Individual Division t 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 37 ~ Q. From 1928 to date then your connection has 
been with the Department f 
A. Yes .. 
Q. All of the returns of intangible personal property filed 
by taxpayers generally throughout the State with the local 
Commissioners of Revenue are sent to the Department o.f 
Taxation, are they' not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there the return is audited and revie,ved 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the audit and revie'v of tbe individual returns 
has been under your supervision since 1934 and under your 
assistant supervision, so to speak, since 1928? 
A. Tha.t is right. 
Q. Are you familiar witl1 the administrative practice of 
the State Department of Taxation in connection with the 
taxing of individuals of intangible personal property? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you state the administrative. practice of the De-
partment of Taxation in connection with individual accounts 
owing individual residents of Virginia including cash balances 
owing· by brokers T · 
A. The Department of Taxation bas uniformly ruled that 
items of indebtedness to an individuat resident of 
page 38 ~ N'irginia should be included in the resident's re-
port of such intangible property as is defined by 
Section 69 of the Tax Code. We have fonnd that such in-:-
debtedness exists in many forms and we ascertain its existence 
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in several ways. It is the practice of lthis Department to 
make regular examinations in the offi~e and in the field 
through auditors of the reports of intangible property shown 
on the returns filed by individuals and when any item of in-
debtedness is found to exist on the 1st of apy year with respect 
to an individual resident creditor whose intangible property 
is taxable in the form in which it exists, then we proceed 
to assess the tax thereon, if it is not included in that indi-
vidual's return as filed with the Commissioner of the Reve-
nue. The indebtedness may be owing by a corporation to 
one of its officers, en1ployees or stockhold~rs, by an insurance 
company to an individual who has left ;money with the in-
surance company or by-
J\IIr. Craig: If your Honor please, I object to the witness 
reading into the record a statement in regard to the adminis-
trative rulings of the Tax Department in 90nnection with this 
matter. The question of whether or not these credit balances 
are taxable as money, or as bonds, notes, ,and so forth, under 
Section 69 of_ the Code, must be determined by the law as 
written into the Tax Code of Virginia. 
The Court: I think it has some bearing on the 
page 39 ~ construction of the statute which 1nay or may not 
·bind the Court. Somethnes it does and sometimes 
, it does not, and I think it ought to go into, the record. 
1\fr. Craig: I object to any statement of the witness along 
this line at all and, in particular, to any, statement which is 
not limited to the administrative policy of the Tax Depart-
ment in connection with taxing credit balances with brokers 
which is the issue in this case. 
The Court: A similar p,roposition might be relevant. I 
will let it go in. 
~Ir. Martin: I don't wish to. argue the ,point because your 
Honor has ruled, but I wish to state tha~ Mr. Miller is not 
testifying as to any question of law. He is testifying as to a 
question of fact, that is, the administrative practice of the 
Tax Department. 1 • 
A. (Continuing·) To go back for a mo~ent, the indebted-
ness may be owing by a corporation to i
1
one of its officers, 
employees or stockholders, by an insuranc~ company to an in-
dividual who has left money with tl1e insur~nce company or by 
a partnership to a partner or other individual. There are 
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many different kinds of corporations and partner-
page 40 ~ ships. A corporation or partnership engaged in a 
business that is taxable on its capital must file a 
capital return. ~1_1he capital return calls for a. report of the 
excess of receivables over payables and all payables in ex-
cess of $300 shall be itemized so as to give name and address 
of the payee and the amount due from each payee. The capi-
tal tax returns filed by corporations and partnerships are 
audited in the corporation and partnership divisions and 
when it is ascertained tha.t a corporation or partnership has 
deducted, as an item of payables, the amount due by it to an 
individual, a memorandun1 report thereof is prepared by the 
corporation or partnership division on a form No. 500 E. Such 
form reports the fact as to the existence of this payable and 
gives the name and residence of the payee and the amount 
due him. This form is placed in the folder of the individual 
payee. The audit of the individual's folder will determine to 
what extent the payable has bee-n reported by the payee in his 
report of intangibles as defined by Section 69. If the item has 
not been reported we proceed to make the assessment thereon. 
The Departn1ent has never made any distinction in such as-
sessments by reason of the character of the business of the 
debtor. The Department has uniforn1ly ruled that an indebt-
edness to an individual resident is taxable to that individual 
regardless of the character of the business of the debtor. 
Many assessments have been made with respect to such items 
as are owed by debtors engaged in many different 
page 41 r kinds of business. The Departn1ent has never re-
lieved one fron1 an assessment in such a case simply 
because there was no formal document binding the debtor in 
the hands of the c.reditors. Many ~ssessments have been made 
on items where the only evidence was the entry on the books 
of the debtor. For example, an officer of a corporation mav 
not desire to withdra'v all of the salary earned and credited 
to him. The unpaid portion of the salary will appear on the 
capital tax returns of the corporation as an item of payables 
by the corporation. If the officer does not report in his in-
dividual intangible return the indebtedness to him as an item 
of taxable intangibles under Section 69, we call upon him for 
a report thereof as soon as the facts are ascertained. 
In 1933, by reason of the investigation of a particular in-
dividual, it was ascertained that certain balances with stock 
brokers in Richmond were treated by the individual tax-
payer as an item of money, taxable under Section 70 of the 
Tax Code. Upon a furtl1er investigation it was found that 
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some customers of stock brokers reportek such balances with 
such brokers as an item of intangible prdperty, t~able under 
Section 70 as money. This was the first time that the ques-
tion had been raised with the Department. and the Department 
ruled that such credit balance with a broker was taxable as 
an item of intangible property defined by Section 
page 42 r 69 and was not taxable under Section 70. This 
ruling has never been changed. One or more of 
such brokers' customers strenuously argued that brokers in 
Virginia were doing· a banking busines~. The Department 
took the view that in 1933 there were no brokers in Richmond 
doing a banking business and yet the Department did not 
desire to work a hardsl1ip and concluded to inform customers 
of brokers of the Department's ruling so that they might, if 
they chose, so arrange their affairs in the future as to avoid 
the tax at the 50 cent rate. .A letter was sent to all of the 
brokers in Richtnond, advising them that the Departn1ent had 
ruled that credit balances with brokers ·were taxable under 
Section 69 and that on or after January i.st, 1934, such ruling 
would be invoked and such balances as were ascertained to 
exist on January 1st, 1934, or on January 1st of any sub-
Sf' )nent year 10ould taxed at the 50 cetlt rate. It is realized, 
of course, that the tax laws have not been enforced so as to 
tax every iten1 of existing taxable intangible property, whether 
of the kind involved here or of any other kind. However, the 
Dopa rtment has used its full means to enforce the tax laws 
as nearly perfectly as practicable. 
In the :fiscal year ending e.Tune 30, 1935, the Department of 
Taxation assessed upon the intangibles defined by Section 69 
of the Tax Code $68,284.48 of taxes, based on $11,426,416.00 
of value. These values and assessments were in addition 
to tl1e items that ·were assessed upon the values voluntarily 
reported by taxpayers to the Commissionet· of the 
page 43 ~ Revenue. The item of $68,284.~8-
l
r 
l\fr. Craig: If your Honor please, [ renew my ob-
jections to the' witness' statenlent and rarticularly to the 
statistics that he is atten1pting to give and \read into the record 
in connection with the volume of intangibles and an1ount of 
tax which certainly have nothing whatever to do with the 
question of tlte administrative ruling in ~onnection with the 
taxation of credit balances with brokers. lr The statistics that 
he is giving involve, as I understand it, all intangibles and 
are not necessarily lhnited to the question of ho'v many dol-
lars-
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Mr. Martin: "\Ve are going to bring that out. 
Mr. Craig: -have been taxed in connection with credit 
balances. If counsel for the department says they will bring 
that out, I am objecting to the fact that what they have brought 
out is utterly incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant to this 
investigation. · 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
~I:r. Craig: I note an exception. 
A. (Continuing) The item of $68,284.48 was assessed solely 
aR the result of the investigations and audits of the State Tax 
Department except that it included $3,214.32 of 
page 44 ~ tax assessed upon values reported by the Exam-
iners of Records. In ·the fiscal year ending June 
30, 1936, there was assessed in the same manner, upon the 
same class of intangible property, $65,596.26 of taxes based 
upon $11,128,829.00 of value. That included $2,6'72.08 likewise 
assessed upon values reported by Examiners of Records. In 
the fiscal year ending June 30th, '37, there was assessed in 
the same manner and upon the same class of intangible prop-
. erty, $82,516.00 of tax upon $12·,725,782.00 of values including 
$4,253.73 of tax assessed upon values reported by Examiners 
of Reeords. Such intang1'bles have been assessed by this De-
partment uniformly regardless of the payment of interest 
on such indebtedness. Large amounts have been assessed ,vith 
the tax even where no interest is claimed ot paid. 
Mr. Craig: If your Honor please, simply for the purpose 
of the record, with deference to your previous ruling, I 
want to move the Court to strike the witness' statement which 
. he has read into the record insofar as it is not specifically 
limited to the question of the administrative rulings and prac-
tices in connection 'vith credit balances 'vith brokers. 
The Court: Objection overruled. 
Mr. Craig: I note an exception. 
page 45 ~ By Mr. Martin: · 
Q. Mr. }!iller, you have illustrated the classes 
of open accounts by saying it might be indebtedness owing· 
by a corporation to one of its officers, employees or stock-
holders, by an insurance company to an individual who lias 
left money with the insurance company or by a partnership 
to a partner or other individual. I take it that was purely 
for the purpose of illustration and by no means represents 
the different classes of open accounts that may e~st in the 
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A. That is right. Of course, there are many other classes 
that exist. ~ 
Q. Yon mentioned an inter-departmental form qOOE. That 
is the report of deduction on capital return of an account 
payable. Will you file a copy of that form as your Exhibit 
No. 17 
A. Yes, sir. 
(This paper was marked Exhibit Miller No. 1.) 
Q. As I understand, this form is purely a form sent by 
the Partnership Division or the Corpor*tion Division to the 
Individual Division to furnish information as to a taxable 
account payable to an individual? · 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Just used in the department itself¥ 
A. That is right. · 
Q. Do you happen to know; how long tl1is forn1 
page 46 ~ has been in use, or one similar to it? 
A. I think since I have been ~vith the department. 
I wouldn't like to say definitely but certainly for a great many 
years, for several years. prior to 1934. 
Q. Mr. Miller, prior to 1934 did the department ever re-
quest the Attorney General for a ruling on the taxahility, 
under Section 69, of an open account? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did the Attorney General give the department an official 
opinion in writing? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Will you produce, as your -Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3, the 
letter from the Department to the Attorney General dated 
April 5, 1932, and the Attorney Gerieral:'s reply dated April 
9, 1932. 
Mr. Craig: If your Honor please, I oJject to the introduc-
tion of an opinion of the Attorney Generf-1 in connection with 
this matter. Certainly that has nothing tp do with the matter 
of the administrative practice to attempt to· bring into this 
record a legalistic opinion of n1y distilnguished adversary 
on the very issue here. I\ 
:\t[r. Martin: It was not written by me. I wrote the request 
for the opinion. ' 
page 47 ~ The Court: The objection is sustained. I wil1 
be glad to listen to it when the argument takes 
place for what it is worth. 
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·Mr. Martin: If your IIonor please, I wasn't trying to prove 
administrative practice. I was simply trying to prove the 
ruling of the Attorney General. 
The Court: I don't think that is a fact that can come in 
at this tinie. 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Miller, all of these questions relate to your ex-
perience with the Department from 1928 on? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The Department has always treated a man's claim for a 
sum admitted to be due by a debtor as taxable under ·Sec-
tion 69 and whether or not the creditor had an instrument 
evidencing the debt signed by the debtor; is that a fact? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. The payment of interest has never been made a test? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As I understand your testimony, the credit balances due 
by brokers to customers are simply one of a class of accounts 
payable that the Department has held taxable by the creditor? 
A. That is right. 
Q. I believe you stated the first time the question 
page 48 ~ of the taxability of the balance due by a broker 
to one of its customers, such as is in testimony 
here, was raised with the Department was in 1933? 
A. As far as I know, yes, sir. 
Q. And that was in the regular course of audit of the re-
turn of an individual? 
.A. Yes, sir. · 
Q. And then it was that .the Department made some exami-
nation and found that some of these balances had been re-
ported by custmners as money on deposit under Section 70 of 
the Tax Code? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. You do not n1ean to say that all customers had been 
reporting them as money on deposit? 
A. No, I have no way of determining that. 
Q. It was found out that some of them were doing it? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And tl1ereupon the Department, I believe you testified, 
wrote a. letter to brokers enclosing a ruling that the De-
partn1ent 'vas making· for their information? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you a copy of the letter of transmittal and the 
ruling? 
i 
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A. I have. f 
page 49 } Q. What is the date of the letter of transmittal? 
A. October 4, 1933. 
Q. And to whom was that sent, so far; as your recollection 
goes? , 
A. A similar letter and similar copy of the ruling was sent 
to all of the stockbrokers in Richmond, including Scott & 
Stringfellow. 
Q. Will you introduce those as your Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 T 
A. Yes, sir. The photostatic copy of the ruling is not 
signed but my recollection is the original ruling was signed 
by Mr. Martin as counsel. The letter is signed by Mr. Martin 
as counsel. · 
Mr. Craig: If your Honor pleases, the document that Mr. 
Miller has just introduced in evidence, 'vhich is a photostat, 
was obtained by Mr. Neal from a stock broker in Richmond. 
It was apparently the only copy extant.: If a letter of that 
kind·,vas sent to Scott & Stringfellow, th~y have not got it in 
their files. We have furnished thttt photostat to the Depart-
ment of Taxation and were informed that it would be definitely 
identified as what was sent from the Department of Taxation 
to brokers, including S.cott & Stringfellow. 
~fr. ~Iartin: I took it that Mr. Miller has identified it. 
page 50 ~ By Mr. Martin: 
Q. Mr. Miller, you remember such a ruling and 
such a letter, do you not? . 
A. I recall very definitely seeing many times our office copy 
of the departmental ruling and the office 'copy of the various 
letters written to brokers and from my definite recollection of 
the substance of both of those, I am satisfied that this is a 
copy of what was actually sent out. It cerii;ainly expresses the 
rulin~ of the Department and I know t1.at that ruling was 
sent to each one of the brokers in Riehm 1nd, including Scott 
& Stringfellow, in the fall of 1933. 
Note: The following· are copies of Exhibits Miller Nos. 2 
and 3: 1 
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Gentlemen: 
EXHIBIT MILLER NO.2. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION 
Richmond 
C. H. Morrissett 
State Tax Commissioner 
vV. R. Parr 
Executive Assistant 
October 4~ 1933. 
There is enclosed for your information a statement of the 
Department of Taxation in connection with the liability to 
property tax of money of individuals on deposit 
page 51 ~ with private banks. 
:M:M 
Very truly yours, 
W. W. MARTIN, 
CounseL 
EXHIBIT :!\fiLLER NO. 3. 
The Department has given consideration to the taxation of 
money of individuals on deposit with private bankers. In 
the past this class of money has been in some instances re-
ported as money on deposit m1der Section 70 of the Tax Code 
of Virginia and taxed at the rate of twenty cents on every 
one hundred dollars. 
Section 70 of tl1e Tax Code provides that money to be 
taxed as such shall be ''on deposit with any bank or other 
corporation or firm doing a bam.kin.g business. * • • '" Sec-
tion 4149(3) of the Virginia Code of 1930 provides in effect 
that no person, partnership or corporation shall do a banking 
business except a duly chartered bank, the section not apply-
ing, however, to "private bankers who shall have been en-
gaged in business on the first day of January, nineteen hun-
dred and ten 11• 
The conclusion of the Department from the hvo statutes 
above mentioned is that in order for money of an individual 
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on deposit with a private banker, who Jas engaged in busi· 
ness on January 1, 1910, to be taxed as subh at the twenty cent 
rate, such private banker m!Jst in fact be doing 
page 53 ~ a banking b~tsiness; if the priyate banker is not in 
fact doing a banking business it manifestly fol-
lows that money on deposit with him is taxable under the pro-
visions of Section 69 of the Tax Code at the fifty cent rate. 
This information is being furnished now so that all con-
cerned will be informed before the beginping of the '!lext tax 
year (January 1, 1934). 
By Mr. Martin: 
Q. You spoke of the question of the: taxability of these 
balances due by brokers to customers coming up for the first 
time in 1933. There is nothing new aboutja new question com- . 
ing up in the Department, is there? They are constantly comJ 
ing upY 1 
A. No, sir, it frequently happens. 
Q. From your observation and your supervision of the 
audit work of the Department of Taxatjon, are there large 
values considered taxable by the Depart:J;nent of Taxation in 
the form of open accounts owing to individuals? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Craig: I object to that question. How much is involved · 
has certainly nothing to do with the solution of the question 
at issue. 
The Court: If you limit that to credit balances of brokers, 
I will permit it. · ' 
page 54 ~ Mr. 1\{artin: The point I attempted to make in 
the testimony is that these brokers' balances are 
simply a class of open accounts and that :there are large tax-
. able values involved, if they are taxable.' 
The Court: I understand that but you. have tied in every-
thing else. It might go too far afield. I:think it is all right 
for him to say, in a general way, that they are taxable but 
to go into specific sums I don't think bear$ on it. 
1\fr. Martin: I except to your Honor's ~·uling. 
I Q. Mr. 1\filler, in your opinion are there large taxable valuee: 
involved in .open accounts owing to brok! .. rs' customers? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. These statistics you gave as to th: amount of values 
that had been ascertained by the Deparbhcnt in its audit do 
not mean that those values include entirely either open ae-
counts generally or open accounts due f1;om brokers to cus-
tomers, do they? : 
56 ~upreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
A. No, sir, the statement related to all intangibles defined 
by Section 69, a large part of which are open accounts of in-
debtedness from various kinds of concerns, including stock 
brokers. 
Q. Those figures rnerely represent the assessed values de-
termined by the Deparbnent as a result of audits' 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 55 ~ Q. And they represent but a small percentage of 
the values regularly reported on the returns filed 
with the· Commissioner of the Revenue? 
A. That is true. 
Q. I believe you stated that the Department of Taxation 
in no way claims that one hundred per cent of intangibles 
are ascertained' 
A. I did so state, yes, sir. 
Q. In other words, there are a lot of various classes of in-
tangible personal property that' are not reported for taxation 
at all1 
A. Yes. 
Mr. Craig: I object to this line of questioning·. It is utterly 
immaterial to the issues involved in this case. 
The Court : I don't see the relevancy of it myself. It is in 
the record and I will let it stav in there. 
lVIr. Craig-: I except, your Honor. 
By Mr.- Martin: 
Q. You were speaking of the administrative practice of tl1e 
Department of Taxation, 1\Ir. ].\filler. You were referring 
to the practice of the State Tax Con1missioner who is the State 
Department of Taxation, were you not 1 
A. Yes, he has approved all rules and views that have 
been expressed. It is the ruling of the State Tax. 
page 56 ~ Commissioner that I am referring to. 
Q. There was some testimony as to the form of 
the assessment made by the Department and sent to lVJr. 
Stringfellow. I believe the record showed that he was as-
sessed by the Departn1ent as "bonds, etc." with the value 
and tax shown. Can you explain why that term ''bonds, 
ete. '' is used? 
.. l\ .. That is simply a brief and eonvenient designation of 
all intan~ib1es defined by Section 69 of the Tax Code. The 
form of tho hill is such that there is not room to classify in a 
specific way snch iten1s as n1ay be subjected to tax and th'i-ongh 
practice the Department has generally designated all iten1s 
of intangibles defin(lcl by Section 69 in the general term of 
''bonds, etc.''. 
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· Q. I take it therefore that if the assesslent were on a note 
or on an open account or 'vere on a demand or claim, still the 
bill would show ''bonds, etc.''? I 
A. That is right, in. every case where the assessment was 
made under Section 69 the assessment 1would be described 
as "bonds, etc.'' regardless of whether it was an open ac-
count, a bond or note or any other item' of intangible prop· 
erty. 
Q. Mr. Miller, did you know that ~here was a group of 
bankers and brokers or brokcrq in. Virgi11ia who were clastii-
fied as private banker:.; ·t 
A. Yes, sir. 
page 57 } Q. Will you tell just what you know about the 
classification of the group T 
A. The. question of these balances was discussed in the De-
partment at the time and certainly then; I knew that there 
were certain firms in Virginia who had in years past bef.m 
licensed as private bankers. · 
Mr. Craig: If your IIonor please, I object to this line of 
testimony insofar as it is not limited to the status of Scott & 
Stringfellow, the broker with whom the: credit balances ln 
tl1is case were had. 
The· Court: I will let it go into the reco-rd. I don't see the 
relevancy now. It might develop btPr. I will l·~t it go in 
and rule on it later. 
Mr. Craig: I except, your Honor. 
Mr. Martin: The ·reason I wn:; bringing it out, and Ivir. 
1\Hller has so testified, was that rrwney on those open account~ 
was reported by son1e taxpayers us 1noney on d~posli. I was 
simply trying to establish a reason why that praetiee probably 
grew up and I was about to a:;1{ ~~ ,_ •• ~!iller if he dirln 't know 
or was not informed. that Scott & Strin.~fcllow was one of that 
group of private bankers. 
Q. 'Vus that your information f ', 
A. Yes, I was informed that Scott & Stringfello"' was one 
of the private bankers and licensed as such in years past. 
I 
page 58 r Mr. Craig: I object to the ':Statement which is 
hearsay-"! was informed''. ]f the 'vitness knows 
what the status of Scott & Stringfello'v .~as, that would be 
relevant and material. It is hearsay ev~~ence in regard to 
the historical characteristic of this firm 1and I object to it". 
The Court: Objection overruled. One of the partners cor-
roborated 1\fr. Miller to the same effect when he was testify-
ing, which may have been also hearsay. ' 
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CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
By Mr~ Craig: . 
Q-. Mr. :Miller, in the broad scope of your administrative 
rulings "in regard to taxing intangibles, would an account 
which an individual attorney or partnership of attorneys had 
against a client £or services rendered in the nature of a fee 
be included Y 
Mr. Martin: If your Honor please, if that qrrestion is 
directed to what the Department does, I have no objection 
to it. If the purport of the question is to as.k 1\tir. Miller's 
opinion 'vhether such an item is taxable, I object to it as a 
conclusion of law. · 
The Court: He is testifying as to the practice of the De-
partment. If that runs counter to the decision of 
p·age 59 ~ the Court, I think it is proper to ask him. 
Mr. Martin : The question is as· to the practice. 
The Court: In other words, when the Department sets up 
an operating practice and does it in the face of a decision of 
the Court, it nullifies, in my opinion, more or less, the wisdont 
of the practice, so I presume that is the theory upon which 
he is asking the question. · 
Mr. Martin~ I have no objection to the question. 
A. No, sir. Since the decision of this Court in another cas~ 
holding that such accounts were not taxable under Section 69 
of the Tax Code, tlw Department has made no assessment on 
any such item of property. 
By Mr. Craig: 
Q. How does the Department differentiate an open account 
claim which an attorney has against a client for services ren-
dered from any other open account claim which you have testi-
fied is in toto brought within the ruling of your Department as 
to taxing intangibles 1 
~Ir. ~{artin: I object to that question as calling for a 
conclusion of la,v. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
page 60 ~ By Mr. Craig: 
Q. Is it or is it not a fact that the Department 
attempted to tax the accounts against clients with attorneys 
of the nature that I described in my previous question f 
A. I think so, generally speaking, at one time, yes, sir. 
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Q. Is it not a fact that in a proceeding 1in this Court the De-
partment- . r 
The Court: He has testified to that. 1 
Mr. Craig: I want to get in the nature of the accounts 
involved. 
~{r. Martin: The record speaks for itself, the record hi 
this Court. 
Mr. Craig: ~1:ay it be stipulated that the record . in the 
case- · : 
The Court: No stipulation is necessary. It can be used 
in argument as a record of the Court. : 
. ~fr. Craig: Can it be considered, tha.t such parts as are 
deemed material for the record in this :case, are before the 
Court? '· 
The Court : There is no· use in filling the record with a lot 
of law and that is ·what it amounts to.' It can be used in 
the argument of the question here. 
By Mr. Craig: 
Q. ~fr. Miller; isn't it a fact that the returns filed by indi-
.. viduals prior to 1933, many of:tbetn, disclosed that 
page 61 ~ listed under money there 'vere .credit balances with 
brokers1 
· · A. As far· as I know, there were none such unless the ques-
tion were raised and assessment made. I don't recall any par-
ticular case. As I stated in my examination, the first time 
the question was raised was in October, '33, when we sent out · 
the letter that has been introduced. , 
Q. Did not the returns filed by indhriduals prior to·. that 
time show there were credit balances with brokers that were 
being reported as money? 
· A. I don't doubt that they did but the question had not 
been raised by the DP.partmflnt. Tf there had been any such 
returns they had not been observed on ~ audit. 
Q. Did you make any investigation, before sending the letter 
that you have filed in evidence, as to s!~ott & Stringfellow 
whether there had been any change wh~ever in its method 
of operation over a period of years prior to the sending of the 
letter? I 
A. You mean a change in the method of the 'Departn1ent 's 
operation? I, 
Q. Operating the firm's business. II 
A. I did not personally send out the letter. I made no per-
sonal investigation ·of the practices of Seott & Stringfellow. 
It was certainly discussed among all of us in the Department, 
I 
I 
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including lVIr. J\IIartin, Mr. 1\{orrissett, myself and 
page 62 ~ some of the auditors, and we understood from all 
the facts that we could get that then the firm was 
not, in fact, doing a banking business. 
Q. Did you find that it had been doing a banking business 
for the three years prior to 1933¥ 
A. We certainly did not find that it had been doing a bank-
ing business in those three years prior to '33. . 
Q. Did you make any effort to assess back taxes in connec-
tion with credit balances after the letter was sent out~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. 'Vould the Department, under its broad ruling as to the 
type of intangibles which are to be subjected to the fifty cent 
tax, include a tort claim Y 
J\IIr. Martin: If your Honor please, I object to that ques-
tion. If he wants to ask the practice of the Department, the 
question is would the Deparbnent include that. 
J\IIr. Craig: I asked in its broad administrative ruling would 
it include taxing a tort claim. 
The Court: You can ask him what the practice of the 
Department is. 
By Mr. Craig: 
Q. "\Vhat is the practice of the Department in connection 
with requiring a return to be taxed as ''bonds, etc." on a 
tort clain1 by individuals Y 
A. I don't recall the question ever having been 
page 63 ~ passed on by the Department. 
· Q. Are they taxable under the administrative 
ruling? 
1\Ir. Martin: I-Ie has just answered the question. I object 
to asking his opinion. 
The Court: Objection sustained. 
By the Court: 
Q. lVlr. 1'Iiller, as a practical proposition, the taxation under 
Sections 69 and 70 on credit balances with brokers, as far as 
the revenue to the C01nmonwealth is concerned, would simply 
mean transferring balances to the individual so that they 
could be t~xed under Section 70? That is the practical effect 
of this ruling? In other words, should the practice of the 
Department be upheld, all the individual would have to do 
'vould be to go clow·n there to write thmn and have them send 
him a check at the end of the year and deposit it in the bank 
to his own credit and on the day after take it back to the 
broker if he wanted toY 
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A. Not exactly that because there is al;provision in the law 
which is to the effect that where one wit4draws money within 
thirty days prior to January 1st for th~ purpose of putting 
it into an item taxable at a lower rate !and then reconverts 
within thirty days after January 1st is not allowed to evade 
the tax in that manner. He is taxable at the higher rate. I 
refer specifically to a section of the Code, Section 
page 64 ~ 78. The la'v makes it printa facie evidence of an 
intention to evade a tax by such a practice as that 
being made within thirty days of the truxable date. I think 
it is fair to say, however, that if the ta:ipayer withdrew his 
balance at a broker and put it in a bank so that on January 
1st it was held in bank and he let it stay there, it would be 
fairly taxable at the twenty cent rate. ! That was the pur· 
pose of the letter that we sent out, to enable the brokers to in-
form their customers so that they might atljust their affairs in 
exactly that fashion, to put their brokers' balances in bank 
if they wanted to avoid the fifty cent rate. 
Mr. Craig: We have no rebuttal. 
The Court doth hereby certify that the foregoing is a true 
transcript of the evidence introduced, together with the ex· 
hibits filed therewith, and of the proceedings had at the hear~ 
ing held on the petition herein filed. 
JNO. L. INGRAM, Judge. 
Decen1ber 23, 1938 . 
.A copy, Teste : 
"'\V ALTER CHRISTIAN, Clerk. 
page 65 ~ Virginia : 
In the Hustings Court of the City of R.ich~ond, Dec. 23, 1938. 
Blair B. Stringfellow, Petitioner, 
v. 
Cotnn1onwealth of Virginia, Defendant. 
ORDER. 
This cause came on this day to be heard upon the petition 
of Blair B. Stringfellow for the correction of an erroneous 
assessment of a. State fax on certain intangible personal prop-
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erty for the y~ar ·1936 made aga~_st him by the C()m.missioner 
of Revenue of the City of Richmo11:d, and for. the correction 
of the erroneous assessment of.· alleged omitted additional 
State taxes upon certain intangible personal property for 
the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, .made against him by the De-
partment of Taxation, and upon the evidence introduced upon 
said petition in open court; ~d was argued by counsel for the 
petitioner and by vV. W. Martin, Esq., Assistant Attorney 
General, who was designated by the State Tax Commissioner 
to defend said petition. And the Court doth hereby certify 
that the facts proved are as set forth in the transcript of the 
evidence together with the exhibits filed therewith, au authen-
ticated copy of which is hereby filed as a part of the record 
herein, and that the said Commissioner of R€venue was ex~ 
amined as a 'vitness touching the application for the refund 
of the tax assessed by him against the petitioner. 
· And it appearing to the Court from the evidence that on 
January 1st of the years hereinafter shown the firm of Scott & 
Stringfellow was indebted to the -petitioner on open acconnt 
for the following balances standing to his credit for the re-
spective years : 
page 66 ~ 1934 . . . . ............ -: ........... $16,123 
1935 . . . . . ........ • ..... •. . . . . . . 15,808 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,470 
and that the petitioner returned the said credit balanc-es as 
"money on deposit" under Section 70 of the Tax Code· for 
the years in question, and that the petitioner paid to the State 
e~ ;virginia the following taxes on said credit balances as 
"money on deposit" for the years shown: 
1934 .......................... $32.25 
1935 ......................... 31.62 
1936. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.94 
And it further appearing to the 8ourt that on November 
19, ·1937, pursuant to notice given the petitioner under date 
of November 10, 1937, the Department of Taxation n1ade an 
. assessment of the following omitted additional taxes against 
the petitioner for the years in question upon the ground that 
said credit blalanccs must be regarded. as "bonds, notes, 
etc.'' under Section 69 of the Tax Code : 
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, I 
1934 . . . . .................. ~ .. $48.36 
19'35 ....................... ~ .. 47.42 
1936 . . . . .................. ~ . . 13.41 
And the Court being of opinion, for tlie reasons stated in 
the Memorandum Opinion dated Dec~mber 14th, 1938, which 
is hereby filed and made a part of the record, that said credit 
balances are not taxable under either Section 69 or Section 70 
of the Tax Code of Virginia, that the assessment of the tax 
made by the said Commissioner of Rev~nue of the City of 
Richmond for the year 1936 upon said credit balance as 
''money on deposit'' under Section 70 wfis erroneous, illegal 
- 0 
and void; that. the aforesaid assessment of omitted additional """ 
taxes made by the Department of Taxation for the years 
1934, 1935 and 1936 upon said credit balances as "bonds, 
notes, etc.'' ~nder Section 69 was erroneo~s, illegal and void, 
and, being satisfied that the said erroneo-q.s assessments were 
not caused by the willful failure or refus~l of the petitioner 
to furnish a list of his property to the ta*-assessing authori-
ties as required by la,v, it is 
page 67 ~ ADJUDGED, ORDER.ED and DECREED that 
the aforesaid erroneous assessl:nent made against . 
the said petitioner by the Commissioner I of Revenue pf the 
City of Richmond for the year 1936, in the amount of $8.94, 
be and it hereby is corrected, expunged from the record and 
cancelled, and that said sum of $8.94 paid by said petitioner 
on account of said erroneous assessment be refunded to him; 
that the aforesaid erroneous assessment niade by the Depart-
ment of Taxation against said petitioner of omitted additional 
taxes for the years 1934, 1935 and 1936, i in the amounts of 
$48.36, $47.42 and $13.41, respectively, be a:nd the smne hereby 
are corrected, expunged from the record and cancelled, and 
that the Clerk of this Court shall forthwith certify a copy 
of this order to the Sta.te Tax Commi~sioner and to the 
Comptroller; to all of which action of the Court the Com-
monwealth of Virginia, by its counsel exce~ted and asked that 
its exception be noted of record which is accordingly done. 
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In the Hustings Court of the City of Richmond. 
Blair B. Stringfellow I 
~ I 
Commonwealth of Virginia. 
. 64 :::)upreme Court of Appeals of Virginja 
~IE~IORANDUM OPINION. 
The question presented by the record in this case is : . Are 
credit balances with stock exchange brokers taxable under 
Section 69 of the Tax Code of Virginia as intangibles Y 
The petitioner had returned his balance with Scott & String-
fellow,~ a stock exchang·e broker of this City, as money on de-
posit and paid a tax thereon of twenty cents per hundred dol-
lars under Section 70 of the Tax Code of Virginia. The pe-
titioner now contends this was a n1istake, with which view the 
Commonwealth agrees. 
To all intents and purposes, a credit balance with a stock 
exchange broker is practically the same as a credit balance 
with a bank, money on deposit. The relationship of debtor 
and creditor exists in each case, and custom has made the pay-
ment by the broker as immediate and as easy as by the banker. 
The pertinent language of Section 69 is as follows : 
''All bonds * * * notes and other evidences of debt • * * 
and all demands and claims, however evidenced, whether se-
cured by mortgage, deed of trust, judg1nent or otherwise, or 
not so secured.'' 
Sections 69 and 70 of the Tax Code of Virginia were covered 
by Section 8 of the "Tax Bill" approved April 16, 1903, 
by the legislature of Virginia. 
The above provisions of Section 69 of the Tax Code of 
Virginia are identical \vith the provisions of the first para-
. g-raph of Section 8 of the "Tax Bill" of 1903, no 
page 69 ~ change having occurred during this long period. 
What is now Section 70 of the Tax Code of Vir-
. ginia, the pertinent language of which is as follows : 
''All money • * * on deposit with any bank or other cor-
poration or :firn1 or person doing a ba·nking business." (Italics 
supplied.) 
was the seventh subdivision of Section 8 of the "Tax Bill" 
of 1903 and was as follows : 
''1\foney on deposit with any bank or other corporation 
or firm· or person.'' 
Not unti1 1922 ·when Section 8 of the "Tax Bill" of 1903 
wns amended hy an aet approved March 21, 1922 (Acts of 
Assernbl)T, 1922, pp. 551, 555) had any pertinent change, as 
i, 
Con1monwealth of Virginia v. Blair B~ Stringfellow. 65 
I 
far as what are now Sections 69 and 70 I of the Tax Code of 
~irginia, occurred except as to the rate of taxation. 
~Ioney on deposit, a credit balance, with either a. bank or 
a stock exchange broker, prior to 1922, by the very terms of 
Section 8 of the ''Tax Bill'' of 1903, was taxable as '' ~{oney 
on deposit with any bank or other corporation or firm or per-
son'' and not as an ''evidence of debt'' or as a ''demand or 
claim, howevrr evidenced.'' If such wns the case, and a casual 
reading of Section 8 would seem to be convincing, would it 
not be proper to conclude that it was not only the legislative 
policy of the Commonwealth of Virginia to treat credit 
balances with stock brokers not under what is now Section 69 
of the Tax Code of Virginia, but the policy of the tax authori-
ties of the Commonwealth as well. 
The n1caning, then, of the first paragraph of Section 8 
of the ''Tax Bill'' of 1903 'vhich is identical with Section 69 
of the Tax Code of Virginia was ve~y definite and :fixed and 
excluded credit balances whether with banks, corporations, 
firms or persons from its terms. 
By the insertion in 1922 of the words' ''doing a banking 
business'', in effect, the taxation of money on deposit was 
limited to money on deposit in banks, but did it, by confining 
the taxation of credit balances to credit balances 
page 70 ~ with banks or corporations or firms doing a bank-
ing business, automatic-ally ch~nge the very defi-
nite, fixed and long established meaning· of what is now Sec-
tion 69 of the Tax Code of Virginia, namely, to exclude credit 
balances whether with banks, corporations,~ firms or businesses 
from its terms. If the n1eaning was changed to include credit 
balances, then the logical conclusion to reach is that the legis-
lature intended from 1903 to 1928 to tax money on deposit in 
banks, and such deposits are credit balances, either as a 
''claim or demand, however evidenced", or as money, or as 
both. 2nd, of COUrse, the legislature did not. 
For the above reasons alone, and there might" be otl1ers, 
the Court is of the opinion credit balances ~ith stock exchange 
brokers nre not taxable either under Secti&n 69 or under Sec-
tion 70 of the Tax Code of Virginia, and a iroper order grant-
ing the relief prayed for by the petitioner ' ill be entered. 
page 71 ~ State of Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
1 
I 
I, Walter Christian, Clerk of the Hustings Court of the 
Citv of Riclunond. do l1ereby certify that the foregoing is a 
true transcript of the proceedings in the case of Blair B. 
I 
66 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Stringfellow, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Virginia, De-
fendant, and that due and timely notice of the application for 
such transcript was given by W. W. Martin, Assistant Attor-
ney General of Virginia, Attorney for the Defendant, to Hun-
ton, Williams, Anderson, Gay and Moore, Attorneys for the 
Petitioner. 
Given ~der my hand on this the 10 day of January, 1939. 
Teste: 
WALTER CHRISTIAN, . 
Clerk of Hustings Court of the City of 
Richmond. 
Cost of this Transcript $13.85. 
Upon request of counsel for Defendant, the original ex-
hibits have been ·certified to the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals of Virginia at Richmond, ,Virginia. 
Teste: 
WALTER CHRISTIAN, Clerk. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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